Earlier quoted context omitted.
The bit that's less practical for consumer setup is more the cert distribution and setup of separate credentials for each user. (The RADIUS server could even be built into the router in a consumer product.)
That's not needed, trust on first connect.
Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]
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Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]
#52Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]
#53I understand that the info to answer my question may not be public yet. I would greatly appreciate an an answer by someone who can explain when it is. If an attacker had recorded encrypted WiFi traffic in the past and then performed one of these attacks could they see the traffic? (I know TLS is used for a lot of traffic, but in time that will be broken too.) It seems to me that a patient attacker could gain a lot of…
Update 2: Apparently anything captured along with the device handshake can be decrypted after the fact if the attacker learns the password used at that time. (Source: https://www.google.com/amp/s/mrncciew.com/2014/08/16/decrypt...) So to decrypt all traffic an attacker would only need to compromise any machine which has the password saved. (Assuming they see the handshake for the device connection.) This indicates that regularly rotating the password (To something unpredictable) has some limited value.