Earlier quoted context omitted.
You can't just define the reals to be something, you have to show that your construction is identical to the other constructions of the reals, like Dedekind cuts or Cauchy sequences. And yours doesn't: you can't represent Chaitin's constant in your definition, which is a real number.
If you wish to take that approach, you have to show that the other constructions of the reals actually construct something that exist. Which you can't. Just like you can't prove that ZFC is consistent. That's why this is a philosophical question that is foundational for mathematics.
First you said the reals are countable, now you're saying they don't exist at all?
What does it mean for something to "exist"? I can construct these sets from the axioms of ZFC, and under ZFC I can show your proof doesn't work.
Philosophy only enters into it when you are considering which axioms to take.