Live data from Hacker News

Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

yubico.com

51–60 of 114 posts

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#51
post #46

In discussions like this the phrase "security by obscurity" gets used as an accusation. We all agree "security by obscurity" does not work. But that's not what is happening here. Wikipedia's definition: "the reliance on the secrecy of the design or implementation as the main method of providing security for a system or component of a system." Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keepin…

This isnt about security. Its about its was open source before and user modifiable and it no longer is. You can force wipe on flash for example. They clearly changed stance to ensure users cannot play with the hardware and competitors cannot copy the code. Which is fine. But its always weird when the argument of security is used instead of being genuine. You can copy the freaking key by removing the plastic of the yu…

"They clearly changed stance to ensure users cannot play with the hardware"

As per the statement (and earlier statements) you can't change the firmware unless you have a yubikey neo developer edition, which was only sold during 2012 and 2013. The change here is that the yubikey 4 doesn't run open source code (for the pgp part) as a result of changing platforms. The best way to show that you support open source is to buy the YubiKey NEO instead of the YubiKey 4.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#52
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Open source doesn't necessarily mean that you can put it on the device. I'm sure a lot of Yubico's critics would be happy with seeing the code even if it can't be flashed.

Yes, it would technically meet the Open Source Initiative's definition ( https://opensource.org/osd ), but if there was no way to re-flash the device, no way to verify the binary on the device, or possibly even no way build a binary (which may require proprietary tools under NDA from the chip manufacturer) -- I think a lot of critics would still be critics, but I could be wrong. If Yubico did this it would be very in…

It would allow a third party to discover a vulnerability similar to the one in the Neo just by just reading the code.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#53
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

None of which precludes the implementation from being open source. In fact, it just means that even if the software were open source, it would be near-meaningless since I can't verify the code running on the device and can't reflash it myself. "Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keeping the source code secret." Yeah, they're not really saying anything other than trying to provide an…

There's a market disruption opportunity here. Carpe consumer base.

Perhaps "carpe emptores"!

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#55

Earlier quoted context omitted.

None of which precludes the implementation from being open source. In fact, it just means that even if the software were open source, it would be near-meaningless since I can't verify the code running on the device and can't reflash it myself. "Youbico isn't saying that the security of the device is increased by keeping the source code secret." Yeah, they're not really saying anything other than trying to provide an…

I think if they released the source, but you weren't able to reflash the device (which is a design trade-off they chose to close some attack vendors), people would be up-in-arms and saying "it's not true open source because I can't re-flash or verify the device."

Except that I was just able to make the distinction... If their response wasn't patronizing enough, now you're adding on by saying we're too stupid to acknowledge the difference?

Nah.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#56

I've studied high-assurance security and hardware for a long time. This looks to be motivated by a few things: 1. Hardware cost money to develop, has to make it back, and is easy to clone. They'll keep hardware secret by default for this reason like everyone does. Also lowers odds of patent suits. All kinds of people demand open, secure hardware but almost nobody will buy it. Just like software. Number 1 problem in t…

1. The hardware design per se isn't that valuable. It's quite easy to reverse engineer and is probably more like a reference design that anything. More likely NXP (?) don't want open designs and open software because it makes it easier to reverse engineer and clone the chips themselves. For YubiKey themselves it's mainly the firmware that is valuable (well, design and access to chips to of course) which is why part of their firmware isn't open source.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#57
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's a very disingenuous summary. It seems impossible to make the device open due to the NDAs. Can you explain how they would get around these? With regards to the applet manager, that seems to be an issue with customer friction less so than being too hard. While "crypto nerds" would be fine, business applications could be affected.

Not using hardware components that would require NDAs would be the obvious alternative.

Obvious? As in "I didn't read the post, didn't read that there are only two suppliers for this kind of hardware and didn't read that both of them require this NDAs"-obvious?

Quote for your convenience:

  So — why not combine the best of two worlds then, i.e.
  using secure hardware in an open-source design? There 
  are a few problems with that:

  - There is an inverse relationship between making a 
  chip open and achieving security certifications, such as 
  Common Criteria. In order to achieve these higher levels
   of certifications, certain requirements are put on the 
  final products and their use and available modes.

  - There are, in practice, only two major players 
  providing secure silicon and none of their 
  products/platforms are available on the open market for 
  developers except in very large volumes.

  - Even for large volume orders, there is a highly 
  bureaucratic process to even get started with these 
  suppliers: procedures, non-disclosure agreements, secure 
  access to datasheets, export control, licensing terms, 
  IP, etc.

  - Since there is no debug port, embedded development
  becomes a matter of having an expensive emulator and 
  special developer licenses, again available only under 
  NDA.

  - Although this does not prevent the source code from 
  being published, without the datasheets, security 
  guidelines, and a platform for performing tests, the 
  outcome is questionable, with little practical value.
You can disagree with this arguments, but just ignoring them to provide an "obvious" answer is a cheap tactic.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#58
post #56

I've studied high-assurance security and hardware for a long time. This looks to be motivated by a few things: 1. Hardware cost money to develop, has to make it back, and is easy to clone. They'll keep hardware secret by default for this reason like everyone does. Also lowers odds of patent suits. All kinds of people demand open, secure hardware but almost nobody will buy it. Just like software. Number 1 problem in t…

1. The hardware design per se isn't that valuable. It's quite easy to reverse engineer and is probably more like a reference design that anything. More likely NXP (?) don't want open designs and open software because it makes it easier to reverse engineer and clone the chips themselves. For YubiKey themselves it's mainly the firmware that is valuable (well, design and access to chips to of course) which is why part o…

"The hardware design per se isn't that valuable"

People that spend considerable effort turning a good idea into hardware that sells tell me otherwise. ;)

"because it makes it easier to reverse engineer and clone the chips themselves."

You first said it's easy to reverse engineer and not valuable. Then, said they want closed designs to reduce reverse engineering and cloning. Which is it?

"For YubiKey themselves it's mainly the firmware"

That may be true. I can't speak to that.

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#59
Couldn't a hardware vendor theoretically provide read-only access to the firmware and then have an open-source reproducible build process so that anyone can build their own copy of the firmware and verify that the firmware on the device is bit-for-bit identical? Wouldn't that satisfy people who want to be sure of what code is running on their device while still preventing an attacker from loading custom firmware?

Re: Yubico: Secure Hardware vs. Open Source

#60
post #41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Open source doesn't necessarily mean that you can put it on the device. I'm sure a lot of Yubico's critics would be happy with seeing the code even if it can't be flashed.

Yes, it would technically meet the Open Source Initiative's definition ( https://opensource.org/osd ), but if there was no way to re-flash the device, no way to verify the binary on the device, or possibly even no way build a binary (which may require proprietary tools under NDA from the chip manufacturer) -- I think a lot of critics would still be critics, but I could be wrong. If Yubico did this it would be very in…

The general issue is when all hardware has software in, in the end it has to be open source. Going even further: The distinction between hardware, firmware, and software is logically irrelevant in terms of trust.
Post reply on HN