Okay. I read the whole thread (ugh). Arguments for using the kernelspace CSPRNG basically boils down to this:
1. Kernelspace CSPRNGs generally don't change, are well audited, and are generally accepted to be secure.
2. Userspace CSPRNGs don't provide any additional security benefit.
3. OpenSSL is a questionable security product with it's history of vulnerabilities.
So, with that said, let's look at each of them.
For the first point, I don't fully agree. The Linux kernel CSPRNG has changed from MD5 based to SHA-1 based. I have heard chatter (I don't have a source to cite this) that it should move to SHA-256 with the recent collision threats of SHA-1. There is also a separate movement to standardize it on NIST DRBG designs (CTR_DRBG, Hash_DRBG, HMAC_DRBG- https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/4/24/28). Starting with Windows Vista, Microsoft changed their CSPRNG to FIPS 186-2 or NIST SP 800-90A (depending on Windows version), which could be hash-based or AES counter based. OpenBSD changed from using Yarrow and arcfour to ChaCha20. So, no, kernelspace CSPRNGs change all the time.
For the second point, I greatly disagree. First, you need a specific RNG to compare to. It's considered "unsafe" to use MD5 as a CSPRNG, although that would require pre-image attacks on MD5, of which it still remains secure. Additionally, a userspace AES-256-CTR_DRBG is theoretically more secure than an AES-128-CTR_DRBG design. While that matters little it terms of practical use, the reality is that AES-256 has a larger security margin than AES-128, as I understand it. Same for using SHA-256-Hash_DRBG instead of SHA-1-Hash_DRBG. Userspace CSPRNGs can be more secure than kernelspace.
Finally, as far as I know, attacks on OpenSSL have been overwhelmingly CBC padding oracle attacks, in one form or another. There have been a couple RNG vulnerabilities with OpenSSL (https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html), but same with say the Linux RNG (https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/19acc77a36970958a4a...). So, I'm not sure this is a valid point.
The biggest reason why you should use a userspace CSPRNG is performance. System RNGs generally suck. The Linux kernel can't get much faster than about 15-20 MiBps. Similarly with Mac OS X and FreeBSD. OpenBSD can get about 80 MiBps (on testing with similar hardware), but that's just painful for a single host trying to serve up HTTPS websites, when the HDD (nevermind SSDs) can read data off at 100 MiBps without much problem. The kernelspace CSPRNG can't even keep up with disk IO.
Userspace CSPRNGs can get into 200-300 MiBps without much problem, and with AES-NI (provided that you're using AES-128-CTR_DRBG), 2 GiBps (https://pthree.org/2016/03/08/linux-kernel-csprng-performanc...).
But, I do agree with one very serious concern on using userspace RNGs in general: they can introduce bugs and vulnerabilities that don't exist with the system CSPRNG. Expecting a developer to get this right, especially one who is not familiar with cryptographic pitfalls, can be a massive challenge. But this isn't the case with the OpenSSL RNG.
So, I guess I don't see the point to move the node.js CSPRNG dependency from OpenSSL to kernelspace.