Earlier quoted context omitted.
From a UX perspective, can we do better? I'll base both off my personal experience - Kmail and KDE Telepathy - since those are my email and IM client. In kmail, to use GPG keys, I need to go to Settings -> Configure -> Identity -> Modify -> Cryptography, change my signing and encryption keys (and it supports PGP or MIME) and then, since I don't already have keys, need to open Kleopatra, the KDE GPG client. Kleopatra…
I think before you even tackle the ui issue there's a general knowledge hurdle you have to cross. Most people are unable to reason about or manipulate uis around keys because they fail to understand the purpose and basic mechanism of them. I spent roughly 5 hours explaining the general concepts behind public key cryptography to my girlfriend and this was only possible after making a compelling argument that everyone…
MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
51–60 of 98 posts
Re: MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
#52Since no one else has explicitly brought this up: https://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto (also see Matasano's "JavaScript Cryptography Considered Harmful", etc.). There is nothing that a service like this will protect you from that you don't already get while using TLS in just about every insecure/non-E2EE chat service. If you're looking for actually secure communication that runs as a Web app, my startup…
From the actual conclusion: "Cyph claims to provide security from a broad range of cryptographic attacks"
Whats the deal here?
Re: MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
#53Earlier quoted context omitted.
From a UX perspective, can we do better? I'll base both off my personal experience - Kmail and KDE Telepathy - since those are my email and IM client. In kmail, to use GPG keys, I need to go to Settings -> Configure -> Identity -> Modify -> Cryptography, change my signing and encryption keys (and it supports PGP or MIME) and then, since I don't already have keys, need to open Kleopatra, the KDE GPG client. Kleopatra…
I 100% with you that UX is the most important problem that is not solved with PGP, and as long as nobody will do something we'll never be able to use crypto. I also believe that if your crypto doesn't solve something that PGP doesn't already solve, then you'd better spend your time on bettering UX instead. However Mumble is not a valid comparison, because Mumble is not End-to-End encrypted. The security of Mumble amo…
Re: MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
#54Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think before you even tackle the ui issue there's a general knowledge hurdle you have to cross. Most people are unable to reason about or manipulate uis around keys because they fail to understand the purpose and basic mechanism of them. I spent roughly 5 hours explaining the general concepts behind public key cryptography to my girlfriend and this was only possible after making a compelling argument that everyone…
This can't be overstated. Even if we got the general public to sort of understand PGP and PKI there is going to be a significant number of users that don't understand the difference between a password and a password protected key. The expectation is going to be that when they move to a new computer that their "password still works" and are going to be extremely angry when it doesn't.
The perfect PGP secure email client would be cross platform and provide its own email server. The client has included trusted keys to communicate with upstream, but when you first start it you make your account and that generates you a signing and encryption key based off your password, backs it up on their server (remember, its password protected, they cannot access it despite backing it up) and then whenever you sign in on other device your keys are downloaded and just work.
This basically turns PGP into username / password, but the only alternative is to use wifi to send your keys between devices when you first start your client of choice - IE, you start it for the first time, it says "do you already have an account? You say yes and it simply asks which PC on the lan has your keys, it communicates with it, you confirm on the other computer to send the keys, and it synchronizes your keys cross-device peer to peer.
And I worry even that is too complicated for my grandmother to be willing to put up with to stop the NSA from reading her emails.
Re: MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
#55It's great that there is such a strong interest in secure communication, but all of the solutions that keep getting placed in the limelight in recent years are either centralised or exclusively available for use with a smartphone (because of the phone number requirement), often both! I'm sure that these solutions are a lot more secure than completely unprotected alternatives, but am I wrong in assuming that if you wa…
> Call me a sceptic, but this is probably why use of these protocols and principals is limited to security experts and software developers who understand these principals OpenPGP is impossible for most email users to get working correctly. Remember that most people don't even know the difference between CC and BCC. Here's an example of de-anonymising anonymous messages, supossedly from clueful users: https://ritter.v…
"You're browsing without Javascript! If you have no idea what that means, you should ask your technical friend about it. Otherwise - kudos."
No, kudos to you. I could count on one hand the number of times I have been congratulated by one of these capability detection messages for browsing without Javascript.
Re: MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
If Kim Dotcom says you can't trust something does that mean you can? https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kim_Dotcom#Werdegang
Nice! For those that don't know, Kim Schmitz / Kimble(now Dotcom), sold out his fellow warez peers to the copyright lawyer Günter Freiherr von Gravenreuth. Like the wild West he was supposedly paid per head. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/04/17/where-k... Not mentioned in the article is his involvement in the AT&T calling card fraud conspiracy (estimated losses $20 million) in the early '90's. It is t…
Re: MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
#57Since no one else has explicitly brought this up: https://tonyarcieri.com/whats-wrong-with-webcrypto (also see Matasano's "JavaScript Cryptography Considered Harmful", etc.). There is nothing that a service like this will protect you from that you don't already get while using TLS in just about every insecure/non-E2EE chat service. If you're looking for actually secure communication that runs as a Web app, my startup…
From your site (attributed to cure53): "Cyph provides security from a broad range of cryptographic attacks" From the actual conclusion: "Cyph claims to provide security from a broad range of cryptographic attacks" Whats the deal here?
The thinking there was that there wasn't a good way to quote any single part of the report without introducing unnecessary and/or fishy ellipses, because although the point of the rest of the conclusion is that it confirms the claim made by Cyph, there wasn't a readily available standalone sentence in there which could go on the front page.
Background: I advised Cyph on AppSec topics on behalf of Mach37 as a mentor, and I helped coordinate the Cure53 pentest. I'm the one who sourced the quote.
Give me a few moments (or days; we'll see) for me to find a good way to publicly and non-repudiably present the exact source of the quote.
Edit:
Signed statement: http://pastebin.com/HcL5bneg
Key: https://keybase.io/cure53
Hat tip to Mario (https://twitter.com/0x6d6172696f)
Re: MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
#58How does this compare to something like cryptocat?
It is basically cryptocat.
Of course, you still have the problem of deploying a secure application within the attack surface minefield of a web browser, but that's a separate issue.
[0]: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1PGS50eZB9Ud7wVKmrc0HU_FD...
Re: MEGAChat now includes end-to-end encryption
#59Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is basically cryptocat.
Have you taken a look at Cyph (mentioned elsewhere in this thread)? Their app is also basically cryptocat, but they've taken the time to engineer an interesting solution [0] to the "Trust on Every Use" problem that secure web applications have. Of course, you still have the problem of deploying a secure application within the attack surface minefield of a web browser, but that's a separate issue. [0]: https://docs.go…
So: my recommendation is, never use any secure messaging system that boots off a web page. No matter what they claim to do to mitigate the risk.
I'm actually, for a bunch of specific reasons, not super comfortable with browser extension applications either. But at least the browser tries to protect an extension you have to explicitly install and explicitly run.