The bigger mistake than sourcing imperfect components is the attempted cover-up and I am positively surprised that this is even reflected in the headline. (at least theoretically: the first glance takeaway message for this story will always be "security hole in car!", no matter how much the author tries to put the cover-up in focus)
VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
51–60 of 226 posts
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#52[deleted]
http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/13/1052591776195.html
"Suchart said he was on his way to give a speech to central bank officials from 17 countries when his ministry-assigned BMW car stalled on a road, not far from his house.
The engine stopped, the air conditioning shut down, the doors got locked and the windows wouldn't roll down, he said, adding that he was trapped for about 10 minutes.
"We couldn't breath because there was no air," he said.
Suchart and his driver waved at passers-by to draw attention to their plight, but it took a while to make them understand that they wanted the windows smashed.
Finally, a guard of a nearby building came to their rescue with a sledgehammer and broke a window. Suchart then climbed out of the car through the hole."
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#53If I read this correctly, the vulnerable vehicles are not really left in a worse state because of this defect. If they did not have cryptographic electronic start, they'd simply be vulnerable to old-fashioned hotwiring. I could be wrong, as I haven't been in a recent model, but I assume there is still a physical steering column lock that needs to be disabled, no?
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#54Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not only that - but the 'duh' moment for me was the 96bit key size.
96 bits by itself probably isn't within reach of brute forcing - I assume the algorithm itself had flaws.
2 communications isn't much at all. Getting something from your car and locking it back up is all it takes.
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#55Happy to see the GTI not listed on there but why would that be any different from the other models? You think they would use the same across the board.
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#56Earlier quoted context omitted.
As far as my limited understanding goes using the the key fob for remote central locking does not expose any risk, instead its the immobiliser part, so manually opening your door with the physical key provides no extra safety, its when the key is present near the ignition barrel, thats where the immobiliser kicks in and where this venerability exists
From what I understand, they have to capture two uses of the key fob to be able to brute force, so if you don't use it then they can't capture anything. Or they just captured two uses from a random car and now it'll work on any car. I wish the article went into more detail.
They captured 2 uses of the RFID-based immobilizer. That gets used every time you start the car, regardless of how you unlocked the car. It's completely separate from the UHF-based keyless entry system which you use to unlock the car.
The paper makes this distinction in the first paragraph, but of course the article fails to distinguish.
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#57Earlier quoted context omitted.
You could always use a club: http://www.amazon.com/Club-1000-Original-Steering-Wheel/dp/B... But anyone waiting to spend 30 minutes with an electronic crack is also smart enough to use liquid nitrogen to crack this too. The difference is that a keyless hack can look natural since there is no physical force for entry or ignition. A funnel and chisel would raise some eyebrows.
This attack is against the RFID immobilizer for the engine, which means an attacker would have to break into the car, break the steering wheel lock and break the physical ignition lock prior to starting the car. The full paper here: https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/sec15_supplement.... has a lot better detail.
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#58Earlier quoted context omitted.
This attack is against the RFID immobilizer for the engine, which means an attacker would have to break into the car, break the steering wheel lock and break the physical ignition lock prior to starting the car. The full paper here: https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/sec15_supplement.... has a lot better detail.
No, it's also an attack on the actual wireless key which is used to open and start the car. It's just making the car "think" that the key is inside, so you just press the Start button and the car starts, after which you drive it away like normal.
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#59If I read this correctly, the vulnerable vehicles are not really left in a worse state because of this defect. If they did not have cryptographic electronic start, they'd simply be vulnerable to old-fashioned hotwiring. I could be wrong, as I haven't been in a recent model, but I assume there is still a physical steering column lock that needs to be disabled, no?
No. The whole point of keyless entry is that you don't need to physically handle a key to enter and start the car. Its presence in your pocket is sufficient to enable the Start button to work. Or, as this article demonstrates, the car's belief that the key is in your pocket is sufficient.
Re: VW Has Spent Two Years Trying to Hide a Big Security Flaw
#60Earlier quoted context omitted.
What I want to know is why the car will continue to accept 100 trial keys per second after the first 100,000 attempts failed. Shouldn’t there be some kind of exponential back-off after failures? If after the first 1000 failed keys it would only accept e.g. one new try every few seconds, it would then take 2–3 orders of magnitude more time to brute force.
That could be exploited to produce a trivial denial-of-service attack.
We’re not talking about a website here.