Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

anthropic.com

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

491–500 of 921 posts

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#491

Post by therein »

ralph84 wrote: post #411
LiamPowell wrote: post #399

> Mythos Preview identified a number of Linux kernel vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to write out-of-bounds (e.g., through a buffer overflow, use-after-free, or double-free vulnerability.) Many of these were remotely-triggerable. However, even after several thousand scans over the repository, because of the Linux kernel’s defense in depth measures Mythos Preview was unable to successfully exploit any of these…

Just because the plane can fly on one engine doesn't mean you don't fix the other engine when it fails.

Except it didn't fail. You just looked at the left engine and said what if I fed it mashed potatoes instead of fuel. And then dropped the mic and left the room.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#494

Post by wonderfulcheese »

bottlepalm wrote: post #478
camdenreslink wrote: post #477

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are they actually too dangerous to publicly release? It seems like a little bit of marketing from the model-producing companies to raise more funding. It's important to look at who specifically is making that statement and what their incentives are. There are hundreds of billions of dollars poured into this thing at this point.

You really think some marketers got leaders from companies across the industry to come together to make a video - and they're all in on the conspiracy because money?

Yeah

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#496

Post by [deleted] »

bottlepalm wrote: post #478
camdenreslink wrote: post #477

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are they actually too dangerous to publicly release? It seems like a little bit of marketing from the model-producing companies to raise more funding. It's important to look at who specifically is making that statement and what their incentives are. There are hundreds of billions of dollars poured into this thing at this point.

You really think some marketers got leaders from companies across the industry to come together to make a video - and they're all in on the conspiracy because money?

[deleted]

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#497

Post by DiffTheEnder »

ex-aws-dude wrote: post #347
zachperkel wrote: post #8

Mythos Preview has already found thousands of high-severity vulnerabilities, including some in every major operating system and web browser. Scary but also cool

Did someone actually go through all of those and check if they are high-severity or did the AI just tell them that?

They mention that they have humans review the most crticial bugs before sending it to the maintainers in their dev blog.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#498

Post by userbinator »

QuiEgo wrote: post #450
userbinator wrote: post #446

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That is something a good static analyser or even optimising compiler can find ("opaque predicate detection") without the need for AI, and belongs in the category of "warning" and nowhere near "exploitable". In fact a compiler might've actually removed the unreachable code completely.

Well yeah, it’s a toy example to illustrate a point in an HN discussion :). Imagine “silly mistake” is a parameter, and rename it “error_code” (pass by reference), put a label named “cleanup” right before the if statement, and throw in a ton of “goto cleanup” statements to the point the control flow of the function is hard to follow if you want it to model real code ever so slightly more. It will be interesting to se…

That's what I'm saying; a static analyser will be able to determine whether the code and/or state is reachable without any AI, and it will be completely deterministic in its output.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#499

Post by rvz »

gck1 wrote: post #426

I chuckle every time says something in line of "the model is so good that we won't release it to general public, ekhm, because safety". Because the exact same thing has been said on every single upcoming model since GPT 3.5. At this point, this must be an inside joke to do this just because.

This how Anthropic is marketing their AI releases and the reality is, they are terrified of local AI models competing against them.

Almost everyone on this thread is falling for the same trick they are pulling and not asking why are their benchmarks and research after training new models not independently verified but always internal to the company.

So it is just marketing wrapped around creating fear to get local AI models banned.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#500

Post by tptacek »

LiamPowell wrote: post #485
SpicyLemonZest wrote: post #481

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They've promised that they will show this once the responsible disclosure period expires, and pre-published SHA3 hashes for (among others) four of the Linux kernel disclosures they'll make. > Running LLMs over projects that I'm very familiar with will almost always have the LLM report hundreds of "vulnerabilities" that are only valid if you look at a tiny snippet of code in isolation because the program can simply ne…

I agree they found at least some real vulnerabilities. What I think is nonsense is the claim of finding thousands of real critical vulnerabilities and claims that they've found other Linux vulnerabilities that they simply can't exploit. There are notably no SHA-3 sums for all their out-of-bound write Linux vulnerabilities, which would be the most interesting ones.

Why is that nonsense? Do you think they exhausted all their compute finding just the few big vulnerabilities they've already discussed, and don't have a budget to just keep cranking the machine to generate more?

They're not publishing SHAs for things that aren't confirmed vulnerabilities. They're doing exactly the thing you'd want them to do: they claim to have vulnerabilities when they have actual vulnerabilities.

Post reply on HN