Earlier quoted context omitted.
> They didn't give up, they appealed. Most of the appeals, as I recall, were also decided on procedural grounds, but by that time it was (IIRC) "this is moot, we're not going to overturn the result of an election that was decided last year". > If I've gotten any of my facts wrong, corrections (preferably with links) would be welcome See "Post-Election Cases Decided on the Merits" in [1]. How do you reconcile the idea…
Unless there are others that reached the fact-finding stage, that's 10 out of 62, meaning 52 were not decided on the merits. So "most" being decided on procedural grounds is still correct, IMHO. But thanks for the link, that's useful info. As for your "How do you reconcile ..." question, I'll assume that the summaries of those ten cases are correct (I don't have time to read all ten of them for myself), and look thro…
Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
491–500 of 501 posts
Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#492Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#493Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#494Earlier quoted context omitted.
Does mandatory auto insurance prevent accidents from happening? If not, should we get rid of it?
No, but it does mitigate the damage... where are we in this analogy anymore? :laughing:
Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#495Earlier quoted context omitted.
> They didn't give up, they appealed. Most of the appeals, as I recall, were also decided on procedural grounds, but by that time it was (IIRC) "this is moot, we're not going to overturn the result of an election that was decided last year". > If I've gotten any of my facts wrong, corrections (preferably with links) would be welcome See "Post-Election Cases Decided on the Merits" in [1]. How do you reconcile the idea…
Unless there are others that reached the fact-finding stage, that's 10 out of 62, meaning 52 were not decided on the merits. So "most" being decided on procedural grounds is still correct, IMHO. But thanks for the link, that's useful info. As for your "How do you reconcile ..." question, I'll assume that the summaries of those ten cases are correct (I don't have time to read all ten of them for myself), and look thro…
Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#496Earlier quoted context omitted.
No, but it does mitigate the damage... where are we in this analogy anymore? :laughing:
You just answered your own question. Voter ID won't solve all the problems with illegitimate votes being cast, but it will mitigate the damage.
Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#497Earlier quoted context omitted.
My wallet was stolen a few weeks ago. I was able to get my bank cards cancelled, but my only state ID is lost. I live within the US, so I've never needed anything more than my state ID. I got this state ID using my previous state's ID. The old one is now void. So I need to get a new one. I'll need my birth certificate mailed to me from my parents, because I'm still in the habit of letting them keep all the important…
So does your boss expect you to go without a driver's license once it expires?
Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#498Earlier quoted context omitted.
You just answered your own question. Voter ID won't solve all the problems with illegitimate votes being cast, but it will mitigate the damage.
Except that it will cause far more damage than it mitigates.
Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#499Earlier quoted context omitted.
> For each election, I have to register anew No. You register once and that applies to all future elections (at least until you update your registration for whatever reason, e.g. because you changed addresses). > and the agency in charge has a backoffice is cross-checking this against... something? Against the state's voter registration database, usually maintained by that state's Secretary of State or equivalent. >…
>If it's from somewhere outside the US, then you ain't eligible to vote anyway unless you've gone through the process of becoming a naturalized citizen It's nitpicking, but you can be a citizen by birth without either having a birth certificate from a country you are citizen of and without naturalizing, but you will have some other document in that case too. >Against the state's voter registration database, usually m…
It's turtles^Wdatabases all the way down.
Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure
#500I don't care how much maths and encryption you use, you can't get out of the fact that things can be anonymous (no one can know how you voted) or verifiable (people can prove that you only voted once) but not both. - Switzerland usually gets around this by knowing where everyone lives and mailing them a piece of paper 'something you have' - South Africa gets around this by putting ink on your fingernail I've read qui…
Actually, I think there might be a way to get both. I've been thinking about this while building my app SoWasIt.
The idea: A public chain records that "user X voted at time T" (like a digital voter roll). It's immutable and public. "user X" could contain voter Id, name, like on a signing sheet. The vote itself (the choice) is stored separately, with a random UUID generated. Privately during the vote, no timestamp, no incremental id, no link to the voter. The UUID is sent back to the voter who will use it to verify his vote integrity. At the end, all votes are published in batches (anonymous UUID + choice in clear). Ideally in an immutable chain so it can't be altered later (and ideally for me on my app )
=> You can verify your vote by looking for your UUID in the final table. => You can verify that the number of votes matches the number of voters (public chain count = final table size) => you can verify the counting for each candidate
=> You can't link a UUID to a voter unless you have both the UUID and the voter's identity, which only the voter knows.
It's not perfect, you still need to trust that the system doesn't secretly store the link between voter and UUID, or have a man-in-the-middle system to intercept votes whil it's processed. And to not add fake voters: That's why you need to publish something like voter cards ids, so that anyone can go to the administration, check that a specific voter actually exists.
So no, it's not impossible to have both anonymity and verifiability – it's just hard, and it shifts the trust to other parts of the system. But that's politics, not just tech
Anyway, in my humble opinion, people manage to cheat with traditional paper vote (mostly because citizens don't care enough to spend time lokking after the ballot box till the end), electronic can only make things worse. And as the French comedian Coluche once said: "If voting really changed anything, it would have been banned a long time ago."