Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's the unfortunate case that they succumbed to schedule pressure. This is similar to the Space Shuttle Challenger decision that led to catastrophe. I think "lying" may be too strong of a word, but they were certainly incentivized to believe it was just a modification of an existing airframe. If I remember correctly, Boeing was essentially told by an airline that if they don't come up with a design quickly the airli…
That's the entire problem. (At least this the view I ended up adopting, and thus my argument.) It goes eyes-shut-closed full-throttle balls-to-the-walls against safety. You don't rush nuclear power plants, why are we doing it with planes? (And yes we should use reuse already approved, known, standardized - modular, components. But they should be indistinguishably the same, not "we certified it the same by introducing…
My experience in aerospace is that the industry swings back and forth on this like a pendulum. A bad event happens and then there’s a focus on safety improvements. Then years or decades go by and no bad event happens. Rather than attribute this increased safety to the process changes, those very same changes are looked at as a burden? Why are we spending all this money and time on quality and safety checks, people say. It’s killing our schedule and budget, they conclude. So they work to erode those processes until another adverse event happens, albeit of a slightly different flavor. Rinse and repeat.