Earlier quoted context omitted.
> You can have e-voting systems that protect ballot secrecy and are verifiable. In these systems the voter cannot verify that their vote was secret as they cannot understand, and much less verify the voting machine. > And you can do that without providing proof of who any particular voter voted for. Which is good for preventing the sale of votes, but keeps things obscure in a magical and correct box. How can I tell t…
you don’t need to be an aviation expert to trust the plane will fly. likewise e-voting systems pass through cryptography experts auditing to verify it does what it says it does. said that the voting solution can also provide cryptographic proof that your vote was unaltered, and accounted for, without need to expose your actual vote. the claims about database altering, are also false as the vote is cryptographically s…
...because when I get on the plane, I can look out the window and see that it's in the air.
With paper ballots, the systems are very interpretable - you can sign up to audit the ballot counting process and watch it happen, etc.
But you can't do that with electrons in a computer - it's really just pure trust. That's what you lose.