471–476 of 476 posts
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Did the Joker admit that Arrow's impossibility theorem doesn't apply to score-based voting systems, or to single-winner elections at all? Some people just want to watch the world learn.
Well, it was 20 years ago, but I do recall there was some discussion at the end about where Arrow's applied, and where it didn't.
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> Every voting system has strategies to use it effectively and most voters are not used to the tactics necessary for ranked choice voting. Just to respond to this one small point, but I think the most common mathematical definition of "fairness" in market designs (including voting mechanisms) is that your utility-maximizing action should be identical to your true ranked preferences (this is called "strategy-proof").…
> I think the instant-runoff voting which NYC is using is mostly strategy proof (i.e. strategies only exist in rare circumstances) The very comment you are replying to pointed out that "a lot of NYC voters aren't ranking either Wiley or Adams" which is a failure to apply strategy where it manifestly exists. "There are front runners" doesn't seem to be a rare circumstance.
This is a valid communication problem with ranked lists, but it's not that there exists a "strategy" per se besides ranking all of your acceptable outcomes.
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> I think the instant-runoff voting which NYC is using is mostly strategy proof (i.e. strategies only exist in rare circumstances) The very comment you are replying to pointed out that "a lot of NYC voters aren't ranking either Wiley or Adams" which is a failure to apply strategy where it manifestly exists. "There are front runners" doesn't seem to be a rare circumstance.
Well, you're right, but we mean different things. These voters are failing to rank their true preferences (you and I believe), which is going to lead to a less optimal outcome than if they had. But if they did rank their true preferences (i.e. they are ok with Wiley or Adams, but just at the bottom of their list), then it would be fine. This is a valid communication problem with ranked lists, but it's not that there…
I expect they are being honest about their preference order, but that this has less of an impact on the outcome (in whatever direction they desire) than if they had been dishonest about their preference order.
This does assume that they actually prefer one of the front-runners to the other by a more-than-negligible margin; perhaps that isn't the case.
> This is a valid communication problem with ranked lists, but it's not that there exists a "strategy" per se besides ranking all of your acceptable outcomes.
There were more than six candidates, and voters could only rank their top five. Voters with more than 5 "acceptable outcomes" need to vote strategically when they get near the bottom of that list.
Alternatively, there is also no such thing as "strategy" in FPTP - "you just vote for one of your acceptable outcomes". That's... not a useful definition of the words involved.
Edited to add: It occurs to me that perhaps you weren't aware of the cutoff in the NYC case and were speaking of IRV with a full list? In that case I agree that strategy being necessary is substantially more rare, leaving aside for the moment whether it is sufficiently rare.
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There is absolutely no evidence that bullet voting has been a problem with approval voting. https://www.rangevoting.org/BulletBugaboo.html > I think STAR is slightly worse than Score I would say they are probably roughly equal, but the best computer modeling we have shows that star tends to perform a little better. https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/VSEbasic/ > However, STAR's main benefit may be in overcoming…
Out of respect for you taking the time to respond, I will elaborate my claims more specifically. My assertion regarding bullet voting is isolated to elections where the voting body cannot be bothered to engage carefully, because they barely care about the race. In addition, the drawbacks must be then compared with other voting methods, which may face the same bullet issue in equal measure. The bullet voting compariso…
A robust cross-system analysis shows that approval voting is more robust to strategy than almost any other method. Most ranked voting methods, for example, fail the favorite betrayal criterion.
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Out of respect for you taking the time to respond, I will elaborate my claims more specifically. My assertion regarding bullet voting is isolated to elections where the voting body cannot be bothered to engage carefully, because they barely care about the race. In addition, the drawbacks must be then compared with other voting methods, which may face the same bullet issue in equal measure. The bullet voting compariso…
> In addition, the drawbacks must be then compared with other voting methods, which may face the same bullet issue in equal measure. A robust cross-system analysis shows that approval voting is more robust to strategy than almost any other method. Most ranked voting methods, for example, fail the favorite betrayal criterion. https://electionscience.org/library/tactical-voting-basics/
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according to Wikipedia: >Gibbard's theorem states that a deterministic process of collective decision cannot be straightforward, except possibly in two cases: if there is a distinguished agent who has a dictatorial power, or if the process limits the outcome to two possible options only. .. it also mentions that gibbard's is specifically about irv. All that aside, I can't understand the idea that we only get to chang…
> it also mentions that gibbard's is specifically about irv. This isn't true > I can't understand the idea that we only get to change things once. Those of us concerned about IRV and promoting cardionality actually looked at history. Between 1910 and 1920 40 US cities used Bucklin voting (similar to IRV, slightly better even) and all repealed them[0]. So looking at history we see that people recognized the need for a…
What I would ask, then, is rather than not doing IRV, what should we do, in your opinion?
I'm looking at this as a sort of crisis situation, as our ability to affect our politics is in a state of constant erosion, and the process of capture at work here can only end in systemic collapse - the further power gets concentrated, the more centralized our decision making becomes, and the more vulnerable we become to systemic single point of failure.
I would love to see STAR voting become a thing. I think of IRV in the current context as a proof-of-concept that might show people that we can change the structure of voting. I can't see anyone wanting to go back to FPTP, because I don't really see anyone who thinks it's even remotely working.