Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm also bemused by the number of people who think they've got an effective sandbox yet their sandboxed agent has access to all of their code, their github, and unrestricted web access.
I keep telling folks that they need to imagine LLMs (even "local" ones) as if you're farming it out to JS code running on some dude's browser somewhere: It can't keep a secret, and a determined person can make it emit anything they like. We need to be asking what the most devious and malicious output could be, and whether what we do with that output (e.g. arguments to command-line tools) would still be safe.
Yet with tens of millions of developers using these tools, there have not been widespread incidents of this sort as far as I know.
So it leaves me with a few choices:
- manually review and approve each command: obviously not realistic, you would just click Approve
- use a sandbox and hope the exploit is not devious enough to escape the sandbox when you run or open the project outside of the sandbox
- use AI without web access and limit other external dependencies
- don't use agentic AI
- use Claude or Codex auto approval classifier and hope for the best
Personally, I'm going with the last option for now.