Earlier quoted context omitted.
If the account is to be believed that's not what happened. They asked the LLM to do something on the staging environment, it chose to delete a staging volume using an API key that it found. But the API key was generated for something else entirely and should not have been scoped to allow volume deletions - and the volume deletion took out the production database too. The LLM broke the safety rules it had been given (…
It sounds like the keys just don't have any scoping. From the post: > The Railway CLI token I created to add and remove custom domains had the same volumeDelete permission as a token created for any other purpose. Tokens are not scoped by operation, by environment, or by resource at the permission level. There is no role-based access control for the Railway API — every token is effectively root. The Railway community…
In most orgs, those would be behind some escalation control. Unless the token creator didn’t know what they were doing/creating, which tracks for a non-expert.