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Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

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Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#451

Post by zaphirplane »

hnburnsy wrote: post #437

#0016 VENDOR: GOOGLE STATUS: FIXED (NOVEMBER 2022 UPDATE) REPORTED: JUN 13, 2022 DISCLOSED: NOV 10, 2022 (150 DAYS) Project Zero only gives vendors 7 or 90 days before disclosure... The short version: Project Zero won't share technical details of a vulnerability for 30 days if a vendor patches it before the 90-day or 7-day deadline. The 30-day period is intended for user patch adoption. https://googleprojectzero.blog…

I am surprised there is an assumption that android fixes will get to users within 30 days

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#452

Post by izacus »

octagonal wrote: post #235
izacus wrote: post #180

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thing is, most phone manufacturers will customize the lockscreen quite a bit, so it's possible (but not necessary!) it affects others.

I don't think many phone OEMs will actually take the effort to muck around in the lock screen mechanisms.

That's pretty much the first thing every single one of them does to differentiate the phone.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#453

Post by SCdF »

0cf8612b2e1e wrote: post #315
gw98 wrote: post #278

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not the OP but I know a couple of Google SRE's and an Android Auto HCI person and they use iPhones...

Sigh, like Microsoft UI designers using MacBooks. How does someone in charge not demand that the developers dogfood the product?

Because then you get headlines like Meta got recently, where developers are being forced to use Horizons(sic?).

TBC I also agree that you should dogfood things you build, especially in the cruisy world of software development where if you really hate what you work on you can just go somewhere else. It is a bad look in the media though

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#454

Post by ak_111 »

gwillen wrote: post #433
jwr wrote: post #381

I have an obsession with classifying software bugs into general categories, looking for the "root cause", or more constructively, for a way to avoid entire classes of bugs altogether. I've been doing that for more than 20 years now. This bug, if you look into the fix, falls into my "state transition" category. You can (and should) model large parts of your software as a state machine, with explicit transitions and in…

Do you have any writing I can read about your classification? This sounds extremely interesting and useful. (I have some related thoughts, but not 20 years' worth and largely not recorded.)

I second this comment. It will be very interesting to see a rough sketch.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#455

Post by Liquid_Fire »

someweirdperson wrote: post #40

But for sure the instruction manual says that the sim can only be inserted/removed while the device is off? Security is ensured!

I was surprised that hotswapping SIMs works, I thought it was not supported.

Many phones used to have the SIM under the battery (back when it was commonly removable), ensuring you couldn't remove it without powering the device off first.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#456

Post by Gasp0de »

wolpoli wrote: post #429
djmips wrote: post #375

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Will it reboot if it's not on network?

Updates need network access. If the phone isn't on a network, then it won't reboot. Police can't really pop out e-sims, that means the police needs to keep the phone in an RF proof bag/work in an RF proof room.

Which, again, wouldn't be too much work. Also, my Android phone does not update and reboot automatically.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#457

Post by djvdorp »

alanning wrote: post #183
notRobot wrote: post #5

Seems to me like this impacts not only Pixel devices but all Android devices? Patch was to AOSP: https://github.com/aosp-mirror/platform_frameworks_base/comm... I don't have a locked SIM handy, but can someone please test on their non-Pixel device and confirm?

One of the commenters on the blog post stated that the bypass did not work on their Samsung device.

That's also confirmed by SamMobile: https://www.sammobile.com/news/nasty-vulnerability-shows-gal...

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#458

Post by Lutzb »

gwillen wrote: post #433
jwr wrote: post #381

I have an obsession with classifying software bugs into general categories, looking for the "root cause", or more constructively, for a way to avoid entire classes of bugs altogether. I've been doing that for more than 20 years now. This bug, if you look into the fix, falls into my "state transition" category. You can (and should) model large parts of your software as a state machine, with explicit transitions and in…

Do you have any writing I can read about your classification? This sounds extremely interesting and useful. (I have some related thoughts, but not 20 years' worth and largely not recorded.)

Reminds me of Orthogonal Defect Classification. Analyze defects for when they were introduced (during development, architectural design and so on) and what caused the introduction of the defect into the system in the first place.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#459

Post by staringback »

vvilliamperez wrote: post #255
staringback wrote: post #233

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am always skeptical of these "lawtech" companies that sell magic unlocking devices. Are we really to believe that there are unpatched security holes in all major devices (both Android and iOS) that allow this kind of backdoor access? I find it rather convenient that the "detailed support matrix" is only available for current customers only, seems to me like the actual amount of supported devices/operating systems w…

It works. It's basically a software brute force that works great for 4 digit pins, takes longer for longer passcodes. Other offerings are a keylogger for the pin/passwords after they "return" the device to the suspect.

> It's basically a software brute force that works great for 4 digit pins, takes longer for longer passcodes

Since the pin/password isn't actually the encryption key and is instead just the code that is provided to the security module/TPM on the device, I fail to see how this can be bruteforced. Unless there is also a magic hardware backdoor in Android phones, but in that case why would there need to be private companies and how would they even have access to this.

Re: Accidental Google Pixel Lock Screen Bypass

#460

Post by alphabettsy »

lars_francke wrote: post #365

The last scheduled security update for the Pixel 4 was the October 2022 one. So this might stay unfixed on those phones. https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/4457705?hl=en#z...

That’s pretty frustrating, I have a Pixel 4 that I quite like.

This is one of the reasons I recommend the most recent lowest-priced iOS device you can afford to family and friends who don’t upgrade often.

My grandfathers iPhone 6s is just now going EOL after 7 years. Apple is a little inconsistent with updates for prior iOS versions but it still received the iOS 15 security update.

It wonder if iPhones end up being cheaper because of the extended support?

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