> As a way to protect himself from this dilution in ownership, what could he do?
First, I think a “dilution in ownership” for founders is possible as an outcome of the tax structure.
My quibble is mostly that the dilution will affect fewer companies that was presented, and will be less dilution than was presented. Specifically, I think it’d be a small enough amount that it’d flip the control from the individual founders to not the individual founders.
In the FB example, it’s worth noting that as of 2019 Facebook already had two classes of shares (class A, held by public investors, and class B held by FB executives, which have 10x the voting power), which (again, in 2019) gave Zuckerberg total control of Facebook.
So, insofar as dual classes of shares already exist, that certainly seems like one option. Zuckerberg can sell class A shares for his tax burden, but keep class B shares. That would dilute his ownership to some extent, but his voting power would be diluted significantly less.
Other options could be paying the tax burden over 5 years instead of a single year (which is in the legislative text), which’d let him pay his tax burden with something like hundreds of millions per year.
Another option instead of selling stock would be to take out loans collateralized by the stock, and use that to pay the tax burden. This would effectively allow them to pay the tax burden over (say) 30 years, which again makes it easier to cover on salary alone.
Or, they could forego the benefits of being a public company (or being a private company that’s readily tradable on secondary markets). There are real downsides to that, though.
To your point, though, I think it’s fair to say that this tax law may dilute the ownership interest of billionaires to some degree. I think it’s less likely than Tim Sweeney was suggesting to wrest control out of founder’s hands (though obviously still possible, especially for any founder that is just barely holding on to 50% ownership).