Earlier quoted context omitted.
> There's more security to be had in an intrinsic architectural feature No, there is not. Even ignoring the question of whether the concept of an ordinal ranking in amount of security even makes sense, this claim doesn't make sense. If the invariant is that incoming connections are blocked by default, an IPv4 NAT and an IPv6 default deny rule are equivalent in security: both uphold the invariant. If the claim is that…
> an IPv4 NAT and an IPv6 default deny rule are equivalent in security: both uphold the invariant Yes, you're correct, on some level, they are equivalent: in both cases, packets don't reach the target machine. That is one of the few levels on which they are equivalent. > There's no basis for claiming the two schemes differ in the level of security provided. Yes there is, this is basic secure architecture and secure b…
The only principles at work here are the ones of superstition and magical thinking. The existence of a "disable security" button doesn't weaken the theoretical security properties of a system when that button isn't pressed, and NAT systems and pure firewalls alike have this button.
If anything, NAT systems are sometimes worse due to things like uPNP automating the button-pushing.
Look: I just don't accept the premise that making a system more flexible makes it less secure. If your threat model includes user error, then you have to be against user freedom to achieve security guarantees.
The amount of "effort" it takes to disable security measures has no bearing on the security of the system when properly configured, and how easy you make it to disable safeguards is a matter of UX design and the tolerance your users have for your paternalism, not something that we should put in a threat model.