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Timeline of the xz open source attack

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441–450 of 482 posts

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#441
post #372

Earlier quoted context omitted.

People have been bullied out of 'nice' communities. See the 'Actix' debacle in Rust.

That was mostly redditors though. Reddit is not a nice community.

Redditors on r/rust are ostensible the same as saying Rust programmers.

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#443
post #72
post #70

I wonder, once the attacker gained commit permissions, were they able to rewrite and force push existing commits? In that case rolling back to older commits may not be a solution. If my speculation is correct then the the exact date on which access was granted must then first be known, after that a trusted backup of the repo from before that date is needed. Ideally Lasse Collin would have a daily backup of the repo.…

Force pushes tend to be noticed easily. All it takes is for one external developer to try to pull to see the failure. And it's actually hard to do because you need to comb through the tree to update all the tags that point to the old commits. On top of that it obviously breaks any external references to the commit IDs (e.g. in distro or build configurations), all the way up to cryptographic signatures that might have…

Of course, that's only since the attack was caught early. Since it affected the machines that build packages, a next step could have been, say, to add code to Git to make it ignore certain commit IDs or mask them in some way. Maybe even modify Firefox, Chromium etc to not show those changes on github. With a backdoor like this and enough time undetected, you could control basically everything.

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#444
post #267

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Where are the email addresses visible? I've also seen this a few times, but never the actual addresses.

eg "Hans Jansen" is https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1067708

When making sockpuppet email accounts use a plausible birth year as your numeric extension.

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#445
It's kind of funny that the attacker used a sockpuppet named "Dennis Ens."

This could be "Denizens":

- an inhabitant or occupant of a particular place.

- a person admitted to residence in a foreign country especially : an alien admitted to rights of citizenship

Good way to describe Jia Tan (singular or plural) and their sockpuppets.

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#446

One big take away for me is that we should stop tolerating inscrutable code in our systems. M4 has got to go! Inscrutable shell script have got to go! Its time to stop accepting that the way we've done this in the past is the way we will continue doing it ad infinitum.

I do think we have enough eyeballs at this point that we should stop entertaining the Dancing Bear in low level libraries and start insisting on crisp, self-explaining code. There are a lot of optimizations pushed into compilers these days, and there are a lot of architectural changes that can make things fast without making them inscrutable.

We should be moving from No Obvious Bugs to Obviously No Bugs (Tony Hoare).

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#447

One big take away for me is that we should stop tolerating inscrutable code in our systems. M4 has got to go! Inscrutable shell script have got to go! Its time to stop accepting that the way we've done this in the past is the way we will continue doing it ad infinitum.

What's inscrutable code? Was it m4 or sh or the combination of the two? Who will pay for all the rewriting you want done? Or even just for the new frameworks that are "scrutable"? How do we guarantee that the result is not inscrutable to you or others? There is so much knee-jerking in this xz debacle. (And I say this / ask these questions with no love for autoconf/m4/sh.)

We are all paying right now for it not being done.

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#448

Is there any law enforcement at all involved in tracking down the players and trying to understand their motivations (is who is Jia Tan, etc)?

I would be very surprised if there wasn't a Federal-level investigation being planned (or already ongoing) into this. Of course it's always a possibility that the attack was, in fact, sponsored by these same agencies.

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#449
post #231
post #223

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Javascript is pretty much guaranteed to be permanent. It is the language of the web. (There's webassembly too, but that doesn't remove js)

I don't think anything is "pretty much guaranteed": things evolve

Hence the "pretty much".

Re: Timeline of the xz open source attack

#450

I think one of the good things to come out of this may be an increased sense of conservatism around upgrading. Far too many people, including developers, seem to just accept upgrades as always-good instead of carefully considering the risks and benefits. Raising the bar for accepting changes can also reduce the churn that makes so much software unstable.

I'm kinda the opposite. Way too many times I've seen "upgrades" actively remove things I liked and add things I hate. I hold off on letting mobile apps update because they almost always get worse, not better.

I think it was Ted Neward who argued that libraries should come with a core and ancillary packages. Only the stuff really necessary and broadly popular goes into the base library, and all of the low use features should go into one or more ancillary libraries.

I still think this is the way to go, but it does move some of the problem around in that you have to pick good cleave lines such that people aren’t forced to pull 5 libraries in for 5 features they need. You want one software domain to use two or three and another to use an overlapping set of three.

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