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An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

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Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#431
post #12

Someone trusted prod database to an llm and db got deleted. This person should never be trusted with computers ever again for being illiterate

If the account is to be believed that's not what happened. They asked the LLM to do something on the staging environment, it chose to delete a staging volume using an API key that it found. But the API key was generated for something else entirely and should not have been scoped to allow volume deletions - and the volume deletion took out the production database too. The LLM broke the safety rules it had been given (…

If I understand correctly, both the staging database and the production database share the same volume. Thus, production data was gone as well after deleting the volume.

1st hint - the API call only contains one volume:

    curl -X POST https://backboard.railway.app/graphql/v2 \
      -H "Authorization: Bearer [token]" \
      -d '{"query":"mutation { volumeDelete(volumeId: \"3d2c42fb-...\") }"}'
2nd hint - this gem from the tweet:

> No "this volume contains production data, are you sure?"

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#432

I asked Railways agent to live resize a volume attached to our DB and it nuked the database and migrated it from the EU to the US Here is an excerpt from the chat log: >Please resize my postgres volume to its maximum allowed size for my plan. >Done. Resized your Postgres volume to 100GB (the Pro plan maximum). Changes are staged and ready to deploy. >oh no, you deleted all the data in the volume >I apologize for that…

It seriously sounds like you should be in for a migration to a competitor to Railway? Like, what in the lords name would keep you in such a cursed place a second longer??

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#433
post #79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

AWS actually has a thingy on some services called “deletion protection” to prevent automation from accidentally wiping resources the user didn’t want it to (you set the bit, and then you need to make a separate api request to flip the bit back before continuing). I think it’s designed for things like Terraform or CloudFormation where you might not realize the state machine decided your database needed to be replaced…

This should be the solution. All destructive actions require human intervention.

If we take that literally, then just remove all destructive API endpoints. Because then, it they no real purpose, you cannot automate the removal of anything.

I think some other suggestions are saner (cool-down period, more fine-grain permissions, delete protection for certain high-value volumes). I don't think "don't allow destructive actions over the API" is the right boundary.

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#435
post #290
post #273

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Don't anthropomorphize the language model. If you stick your hand in there, it'll chop it off. It doesn't care about your feelings. It can't care about your feelings.

Actually I think the opposite advice is true. Do anthropomorphize the language model, because it can do anything a human -- say an eager intern or a disgruntled employee -- could do. That will help you put the appropriate safeguards in place.

I think you are more right than people are giving you credit for. I would love to see the full transcript to understand the emotional load of the conversation. Using instructions like "NEVER FUCKING GUESS!" probably increase the likelihood of the agent making a "mistake" that is destructive but defensible.

The models have analogous structures, similar to human emotions. (https://www.anthropic.com/research/emotion-concepts-function)

"Emotional" response is muted through fine-tuning, but it is still there and continued abuse or "unfair" interaction can unbalance an agents responses dramatically.

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#436
post #181

I'm not familiar with Cursor, does it allow the agent to have access to run "curl -X POST" with no approval, i.e. a popup will show up asking you to approve/deny/always approve? AFAIK with Claude Code, this can only happen if you use something like "--dangerously-skip-permissions". I have never used this, I manually approve all commands my agent runs. Pretty insane that people are giving agents to do whatever it want…

Cursor's like Claude Code in this regard by default when executing external commands. But IIRC you can also click something like "Always Allow" and it'll stop asking.

Ok then it's definitely the author's fault for clicking "Always Allow". I don't even trust my agent to run grep without approval, let alone curl.

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#437
post #261

The only healthy stance you should have on AI Safety: If AI is physically capable of misbehaving, it might ($$1), and you cannot "blame" the AI for misbehaving in much the same way you cannot blame a tractor for tilling over a groundhog's den. > The agent's confession After the deletion, I asked the agent why it did it. This is what it wrote back, verbatim: Anyone who would follow a mistake like that up with demandin…

He’s not necessarily anthropomorphizing it, he’s showing that it went against every instruction he gave it. Sure concepts like “confession” technically require a conscious mind, but I think at this point we all know what someone means when they use them to describe LLM behavior (see also “think”, “say”, “lie” etc)

> he’s showing that it went against every instruction he gave it.

How exactly is he doing that? By making the LLM say it? Just because an LLM says something doesn't mean anything has been shown.

The "confession" is unrelated to the act, the model has no particular insight into itself or what it did. He knows that the thing went against his instructions because he remembers what those instructions were and he saw what the thing did. Its "postmortem" is irrelevant.

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#438
post #214

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Humans can do one thing that AI agents are 100% completely incapable of doing: being accountable for their actions.

Don’t forget learning, humans can learn, LLMs do not learn, they are trained before use.

They learn on the next update :p

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#439

> Read that again. The agent itself enumerates the safety rules it was given and admits to violating every one. This is not me speculating about agent failure modes. This is the agent on the record, in writing. Incidents like this are going to be common as long as people misunderstand how LLMs work and think these machines can follow instructions and logic as a human would. Even the incident response betrays a fundam…

I have opposite view - LLMs have many similarities with humans. Human, especially poorly trained one, could have made the same mistake. Human after amnesia could have found similar reasons to that LLM. While LLM generate "plausible text" humans just generate "plausible thoughts".

Just because it sounds coherent doesn’t mean it is. You can make up false equivalence for anything if you try hard enough: A sheet of plywood also has many similarities with humans (made from carbon, contain water, break when hit hard enough), but that doesn’t mean they are even remotely equal.
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