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Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

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Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#431

Earlier quoted context omitted.

FWIW, I don't think you're really addressing their point. What they're really saying is that they find it implausible that any significant fraction of the population is genuinely unable to go to the DMV once every 10 years. You're not really providing a counterargument, but rather just arguing that going to the DMV is more difficult for some people than others. Sure, but that's true for pretty much everything -- even…

I think of it as another step in a leaky conversion pipeline, but instead of minimizing the dropoff the pipeline is optimized for maximizing. It's not that people are unable to fill 10 field form that sometimes randomly loses all your input, but more people will complete the form if it doesn't. Another thing is when the id requirement is not just there, but added right before the election, so it's not "going to dmv o…

I had a much longer comment here but I ended up scrapping it since it would make for too long of a discussion. I'll just quickly address a few specific things:

> added right before the election

I feel like it's not hard to counter-argue that the writing has been on the wall for decades and it's not a genuine surprise at this point.

> So the actual argument is not that there is link between race and going to dmv once in 10 years

IMO, it's probably better to make the the actual argument.

> DMV

This entire discussion appears to be over a red herring. You may be interested in my comment on the sibling thread: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47345614

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#432

Earlier quoted context omitted.

FWIW Swiss elections are counted in at most 6 hours, usually quicker except for big cities. If your system takes longer than that, it's a bad system. Also it's not just elections to offices, but also votes on yes/no propositions, which can take effect more or less immediately.

> If your system takes longer than that, it's a bad system. Why? > which can take effect more or less immediately. In our jurisdictions they're usually reserved. Courts can be used to challenge laws as unconstitutional. And you typically want a bright line implementation date that everyone can see coming.

Because hand-counting of paper ballots, as done in Switzerland (and many other places) is the bare minimum. Any more complicated system that still takes longer is adding complication unnecessarily. An electronic election system should be able to count all the ballots basically instantaneously.

In Switzerland the courts have no power to rule laws as unconstitutional - this is a power reserved to the people (who are sovereign), via referendums. So when the people strike down a law at referendum, that takes effect immediately as the voting population is the "final instance". Usually when they vote positively for something, there is still then some implementation period - sometimes quite a lot of it, e.g. there was a vote to reform the tax system passed on Sunday, and it will take effect according the government at the start of _2032_.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#433

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's easily fixed by extending the deadline. No new technology is required.

It's not necessarily easy. The timing of Australian elections from issuance of writs is limited by the constitution, and since they can occur at the discretion of the prime minister, you can't prepare for them in advance. Swiss votes are scheduled in advance, but the explanatory material and campaign flyers still have to be made and in order to be topical you don't want to make them too early. In particular the conse…

Constitutions can be amended and there are courier services that are faster than the general post.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#434

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you are doing paper voting why bother with voting machines at all? What's the benefit?

Immediate results without miscounts and at far lower cost. Given some confidence into the system, you'd only audit the paper ballots stochastically for a randomly chosen, say, 5% of election districts each time. [Whether that's worth it, I'll not make a statement on.]

The UK gets it done within 24 hours with very few miscounts and even fewer miscounts that matter.

And is there good data on the relative costs?

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#435
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is not even about understanding. It is about how easy it is to distrust it. Contrary to what nerds think, the goal of elections isn't to get bulletproof results by mathematical standards. The goal is to create agreeable consent among those who voted. A good election system is one where even sworn enemies can begrudgingly agree on the result. A paper ballot system has the advantage that it can be monitored by any g…

> The goal is to create agreeable consent among those who voted. If you still consistently miscount so that popular power isn't aligned with the electoral results, you will still face all the problems a democracy was designed to avoid. Starting with violent protests and revolutions. But then, most countries fail this at other stages already.

Sure. But that problem is not inherent to paper ballots. In fact miscounting (read: manipulation) is even easier and harder to detect with digital systems.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#436
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is not even about understanding. It is about how easy it is to distrust it. Contrary to what nerds think, the goal of elections isn't to get bulletproof results by mathematical standards. The goal is to create agreeable consent among those who voted. A good election system is one where even sworn enemies can begrudgingly agree on the result. A paper ballot system has the advantage that it can be monitored by any g…

How about a machine voting system with paper fallback. You as a voter can review the paper protocol from your vote. If there is distrust, the justice system can review the paper trail as well.

What is the need for it? You want faster results? Not needed, elections don't need to be fast, they need to be trusted. You want to have less humans in the loop to be more efficient? Having humans in the loop is actually a feature not a bug as it distributes the trust on many actors.

Paper ballots work just fine if done correctly and most democracies have a long history of knowing how to do them correctly with very high stakes.

Electronic (or even online) votes are fine for low stakes stuff, like what the color of that new bridge ought to be, but not to select the fate of a whole nation.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#437
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is not even about understanding. It is about how easy it is to distrust it. Contrary to what nerds think, the goal of elections isn't to get bulletproof results by mathematical standards. The goal is to create agreeable consent among those who voted. A good election system is one where even sworn enemies can begrudgingly agree on the result. A paper ballot system has the advantage that it can be monitored by any g…

More bluntly, the purpose of an election is to convince the loser not to send his supporters out on the street protesting. The problem with e-voting is that it gives the losers an infinite number of things to complain about and challenge the election.

This is the point. The way you carry out elections need to optimize for not having the loser riot on the streets, nearly all other considerations are secondary: speed, efficiency, etc.

It is also interesting which role human psychology plays in this. Trump for example used the late trickeling in of the mail vote to incite the January 6th riots. His followers found it shady that the gote changed in the end.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#438
post #12

I don't care how much maths and encryption you use, you can't get out of the fact that things can be anonymous (no one can know how you voted) or verifiable (people can prove that you only voted once) but not both. - Switzerland usually gets around this by knowing where everyone lives and mailing them a piece of paper 'something you have' - South Africa gets around this by putting ink on your fingernail I've read qui…

> Until we all have government-issued public keys or something

Nah, that still boils down to "you have to trust government". And I preferred when "Why would they care how I vote?" was a rhetorical question.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#439

The biggest advantage physical voting has it is follows human-scaling laws. Which often is a problem (inefficient) but for voting this is a massive benefit for one particular reason - due to lack of automation any fraud doesn't also benefit from the same automation so has to be large scale and widely distributed for it to be impactful (the fraud has to be distributed to the humans involved). Which isn't to say that i…

This probably only works properly in the developed countries. In developing countries like India we suffered through decades of "booth captures" [1] where armed gangs would take over a polling booth and cast votes for their political candidate at gun point. Villagers would be disallowed from casting their votes. In many instances, the polling booth itself would be set on fire, ensuring that those votes are never coun…

> This probably only works properly in the developed countries. In developing countries like India we suffered through decades of "booth captures" [1] where armed gangs would take over a polling booth and cast votes for their political candidate at gun point. Villagers would be disallowed from casting their votes. In many instances, the polling booth itself would be set on fire, ensuring that those votes are never counted.

Yeah, but these are visible! They provide evidence that the voting was not fair.

Compare to electronic voting, where a capture might be done and no one ever finds out.

We want rigging of elections to be visible. That's the whole point.

Re: Swiss e-voting pilot can't count 2,048 ballots after decryption failure

#440

The biggest advantage physical voting has it is follows human-scaling laws. Which often is a problem (inefficient) but for voting this is a massive benefit for one particular reason - due to lack of automation any fraud doesn't also benefit from the same automation so has to be large scale and widely distributed for it to be impactful (the fraud has to be distributed to the humans involved). Which isn't to say that i…

This probably only works properly in the developed countries. In developing countries like India we suffered through decades of "booth captures" [1] where armed gangs would take over a polling booth and cast votes for their political candidate at gun point. Villagers would be disallowed from casting their votes. In many instances, the polling booth itself would be set on fire, ensuring that those votes are never coun…

> Not saying this is not possible in developed countries. It could very well happen sometime in the future where armed gangs take over polling booths…

I fully expect this happening more as the systems degrade in the west and, arguably, it already has happened several times now in many different ways, even if executed in more “sophisticated” ways that make it less apparent.

What do you call the many “color revolutions” the US and EU have now perpetrated in many different ways and places? The ”gang” was just a state level actor with immense resources and methods that exceed the local capacity to prevent them… just like a local gang using arms to take over a local polling booth.

There are declassified versions of old and obsolete CIA guides on how to conduct the precursors of such “color revolutions” through long term “capacity building” that is then activated if/when necessary. That’s the voluntarily declassified manual of the CIA; someone might suggest there are more effective instructions that are classified.

There have also been medium sophistication level events like what has happened over the last several years in Europe, where Merkel ordered an election result cancelled through technicalities because she/the literal The Party, did not like the result (I guess you can take the woman out of the dictatorship…), the EU simply used the judiciary to force a “runoff” because the election results were not to its liking, de facto canceling elections, or even all the subtle measures like visually misrepresenting election results where the bar or pie chart does not match the numerical data to suppress public mandate and perceptions about results, i.e., higher result numbers being represented by smaller bars than lower numbers.

I would argue they are all examples of the very same things you describe, the equivalent of “…gangs take over polling booths…” only it’s done through process, authority, policy, or even law and those in power tell themselves they’re doing it for “our democracy” and justified through similar dystopian, narcissistic, megalomanic, authoritarian mindsets; “I need to be in power for your own good because you don’t know any better”.

It could go both ways, either things will increasingly start degrading even more as the power slips out of the “gang’s”hands, and the system starts crumbling around them; or if “digital voting” is fully implemented there will essentially be “backdoors” to make sure the powers can “preserve our democracy” just like they need OS backdoors and media control to “protect the children”, which coincidentally seems to always coincide with them remaining in power and control and the people not even being asked about major upheavals of their society and their votes being effectively meaningless because the agenda is continuous regardless of election results.

It’s like those people who used to play slot machines at the casino, (now doing so digitally on their phones) pounding at the buttons that do absolutely nothing since the algorithm is what determines where the spin ends, not them rapidly hitting an essentially dead button just because the “clicking”, the “voting”, makes them think they have control. . . . “our democracy” where you and I are not part of that “our”.

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