Reported this exact bug to Zendesk, Apple, and Slack in June 2024, both through HackerOne and by escalating directly to engs or PMs at each company. I doubt we were the first. That is presumably the reason they failed to pay out. The real issue is that non-directory SSO options like Sign in with Apple (SIWA) have been incorrectly implemented almost everywhere, including by Slack and other large companies we alerted i…
I do web app testing and report a similar issue as a risk rather often to my clients. You can replace Google below with many other identity providers. Imagine Bob works at Example Inc. and has email address bob@example.com Bob can get a Google account with primary email address bob@example.com. He can legitimately pass verification. Bob then gets fired for fraud or sexual harassment or something else gross misconduct…
1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
431–437 of 437 posts
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#432Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is a common problem with HackerOne and the likes. It's absolutely awful for anything even a tiny bit more unique or rare.
Blame beg bounty hunters for this
Proper response would be to update your program to triage these vulns and thank the researcher for not going public straight away. This current approach is burning a tremendous amount of goodwill.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#433Earlier quoted context omitted.
Blame beg bounty hunters for this
Beg bounty hunters are not to blame for utterly abysmal responses by these platforms. Especially after they ghost the researcher and then moan about publication. Proper response would be to update your program to triage these vulns and thank the researcher for not going public straight away. This current approach is burning a tremendous amount of goodwill.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#434The piece the author is missing, and why zendesk likely ignored this is impact, and it's something I continually see submissions lacking. As a researcher, if you can't demonstrate impact of your vulnerability, then it looks like just another bug. A public program like zendesk is going to be swamped with reports, and they're using hackerone triagers to augment that volume. The triage system reads through a lot of repo…
The dude demonstrated the ability to infiltrate a client’s Slack instance via their vulnerability. If that’s not enough to make the hairs on your neck stand on end as an engineer, go fucking do something else.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#435Earlier quoted context omitted.
Doubtful. It's probably just incompetence, rather than malice. The incident almost certainly cost Zendesk more in (according to the gist) lost contracts and reputational damage than it would've cost to pay the security researcher a bounty.
Or just fix the problem and not pay the bounty. Why pay at all if you can find a way not to?
For a sensible large company, it’s not worth being stingy over (relative) pennies. They waste money like it’s water. They might as well spend where it matters. Bug bounties won’t even show on their bottom line, but cleanup for an exploited issue will.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#436Earlier quoted context omitted.
it never made sense to me why these white-hat hackers don't require payment before disclosing the vulnerability
Bug bounty people do this all the time. It's almost always a sign that your bug is something silly, like DKIM. Later I wrote this comment before rereading the original post and realizing that they had literally submitted a DKIM report (albeit a rare instance of a meaningful one). Just to be clear: in my original comment, I did not mean to suggest this bug was silly; only that in the world of security bug bounties, DK…
only thing that matters is the severity and what it allows the attackers to do.