The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on • Hacker News Board

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#431

Post by eternityforest » Mon, Dec 26, 2022, 3:40 AM UTC

smt88 wrote: post #383

eternityforest wrote: post #204

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Doesn't KeePass use a single database file with no conflict resolution? I looked at using them but ultimately decided against them, a conflict overwriting a password scares me more than even just using chrome sync and calling it a day.

I use 1Password now, but KeePass has conflict resolution and also a full history of all secrets.

Seems like KeePass apps on Android often have decent but not quite perfect UI around conflict merging: https://www.ctrl.blog/entry/keepass-file-conflicts-android.h...

It does seem to be solvable though. I could see myself using SyncThing+ KeePass if I ever became unsatisfied with BitWarden and I found an app without too many sync issues.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#432

Post by TheDong » Mon, Dec 26, 2022, 7:58 AM UTC

aborsy wrote: post #418

TheDong wrote: post #230

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is less secure than using keepassxc, 1password, or another application with a 1st party well maintained browser extension. With keepassxc, 1password, or even chrome's password manager, if a phisher links you to "gmail.scammersite.info", even if it looks exactly like the real gmail login page, browser-integration will not fill in the password field. With pass, the default flow is to copy the password to your clip…

That’s actually part of the appeal. Passwords are per file. Grabbing a password by a Yubikey touch doesn’t expose other passwords. Per password sandboxing. With keepass, you open the vault most of the time to expose a less important password, and the entire vault is at risk. Beyond Pass, you should be careful with the browser extensions (and browser in general ). There are a lot of them, never audited.

> Grabbing a password by a Yubikey touch doesn’t expose other passwords. Per password sandboxing. With keepass, you open the vault most of the time to expose a less important password, and the entire vault is at risk.

The entire vault is at risk only if the attacker has a zero-day in the browser extension, or already has local code execution.

In your threat model, which is more likely:

1. you get sent a phishing link and click on it, and then copy+paste into a password field

2. An attacker compromises your browser extension with a zero-day

3. An attacker manages to get local privileges on your computer, is competent enough to exfiltrate your keepassxc database from memory after you unlock it with your hardware token, but is not competent enough to exfiltrate your 'password-store' passwords, or browser session cookies, or whatever

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#433

Post by milkshakes » Wed, Dec 28, 2022, 4:11 PM UTC

konha wrote: post #316

milkshakes wrote: post #307

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1password for teams works exactly this way so does the family pack

So you’re saying 1Password for families / teams differs significantly from their zero knowledge architecture? Have a look at [0] - recovery works without 1Password having the master password. [0] https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-p...

If you read page 49 of the document you link:

> Recovery Groups One of the most powerful capabilities that a team administrator has is the power to assign members to the team’s Recovery Group. In most configurations the assignment is automatic and Owners, Organizers, and Administrators will automatically be made members of the Recovery Group. In 1Password Families there is no ability to separate the roles of Owner, Administrator, and Recovery Group member; they are all wrapped up as “Organizer.” With 1Password Teams Administrators are given more control, but not all of the underlying flexibility may be exposed to the user.17 17We discovered during our beta testing that it was difficult to make the distinction between Owners, Administrators, vault Managers, and Recovery Group members clear enough for those distinctions to be sufficiently useful. This document describes recovery in terms of the Recovery Group even when the group is not exposed to the Team administrator in those terms.

> Implicit sharing When a vault is created, a copy of the vault key is encrypted with the public key of the Recovery Group. The members of the Recovery Group are able to decrypt the private key of the Recovery Group. Thus from an exclusively cryptographic point of view the members of the Recovery Group have access to all of the vaults. Recovery Group members never have the ability to learn anyone’s account password, Secret Key, Account Unlock Key (AUK), or SRP-𝑥. Recovery is recovery of the vault keys; it is not recovery of account passwords nor Secret Keys.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#434

Post by throwaway29812 » Wed, Dec 28, 2022, 8:50 PM UTC

oellegaard wrote: post #299

sacnoradhq wrote: post #133

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Bitwarden, Keeper ($ but trusted at megacorps), and good ol' PasswordSafe are the safest solutions. I run BW with Yubikey 2FA and a local hosted sync server. KeePassX/C perhaps. Vault for secrets management. Never touched LastPass, 1Password or any of these other mickey-mouse commercial apps that invariably claim "military-grade encryption" or "unhackable" when their fundamental constructions are crap.

Curious to hear what 1Password is doing wrong?

User hostile pricing schemes and removing the ability to sync locally, only on their cloud.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#435

Post by konha » Fri, Dec 30, 2022, 6:33 PM UTC

milkshakes wrote: post #433

konha wrote: post #316

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So you’re saying 1Password for families / teams differs significantly from their zero knowledge architecture? Have a look at [0] - recovery works without 1Password having the master password. [0] https://1passwordstatic.com/files/security/1password-white-p...

If you read page 49 of the document you link: > Recovery Groups One of the most powerful capabilities that a team administrator has is the power to assign members to the team’s Recovery Group. In most configurations the assignment is automatic and Owners, Organizers, and Administrators will automatically be made members of the Recovery Group. In 1Password Families there is no ability to separate the roles of Owner, A…

Exactly: 1Password doesn’t have the keys. Recovery works because the vaults are encrypted with the keys of everyone in the recovery group. No “server side” encryption instead of end-to-end.

Re: The situation at LastPass may be worse than they are letting on

#436

Post by lacerrr » Fri, Dec 30, 2022, 8:49 PM UTC

ryandrake wrote: post #413

anonym29 wrote: post #171

This is ultimately a predictable outcome for any password manager that stores your credentials on someone else's server. Just like they say in crypto "not your keys, not your crypto" - it applies here too. Not your storage, not your passwords. KeePass on an airgapped box, or an encrypted hardware password manager with no network interfaces is best, though frankly, I'd even be more comfortable writing down passwords o…

A password manager is probably the worst possible candidate for being a cloud service. "Your entire list of passwords" is the one piece of data you absolutely, positively, do NOT want stored in the cloud. How these things gained such a following is mind-blowing.

Honestly, though, it's not that bad of an idea. Provides just enough convenience for people to use unique, randomly generated passwords for each login. Much worse for a website to leak the credentials you use for a bunch of other accounts. Using a pw manager and 2fa is imperfect but still the sweet spot in my opinion.