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153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

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431–440 of 754 posts

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#431
post #407

Earlier quoted context omitted.

i know that you're not really serious when you generalize against all of us crypto simpletons, but anytime theres a stupid amount of money on the table people are bound to rush to pick it up. and that means mistakes. the work being done on public blockchains is unlike anything else done before. You don't have he luxury of keeping your db behind a vpn running on a vm platform secured and maintained by the worlds large…

> But if banks and major retailers who have huge budgets can get hacked, of course we can too. Here's the thing: banks and major retailers can't get hacked. At least, not in the sense you're using "hacked". When Target's credit card systems were compromised, resulting in the CEO resigning and and about $300M in costs to the company to deal with the breach, not one customer lost a penny. When $171M from Union Bank of…

From this and your previous comments, I am trying to figure out your basic point. Would you summarize it as, "I have a low tolerance for financial risk and others should think as I do"?

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#432
post #361

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's closest to the middle, assuming that you meant that you're stating the properties that you want to test. It does more than that, but at its base that's effectively how it works so it's close enough for a solid intuition. We're working on a paper about it now -- or at least a sub-paper in the clutch of papers that pertain to a public chain version -- that I'll link to when it's out (a couple weeks probably).

Oh. Dear? (I mean, I understand the pressures of academia, but... ridiculously bad timing, yeah?)

[deleted]

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#433
post #401

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I like your point about language complexity. Can you point to a language that would fit the simple and verified criteria? I don't really follow the subject, so it would be interesting reading.

You could take inspiration from a system like Dafny or F-* and write your contracts with the assistance of a type system and compiler that generated proofs that your contracts satisfied some postcondition given a precondition. People have already written moderately complicated applications like operating systems in these languages, so there's some evidence they could be applied to contracts on the blockchain.

[deleted]

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#434
post #25

Here's the root error I believe: https://github.com/paritytech/parity/blob/master/js/src/cont... The initWallet function should have been marked internal, but was instead not marked. Unmarked functions default to public in Solidity, so anyone can call that function and reinitialize the wallet to be under their control

Please be aware that you can press Y before sharing a link to make it a permalink. The link you shared points to master branch, which will change over time, so the line number you pointed to will have something else. Based on the time of your post, I suspect you meant to link to: https://github.com/paritytech/parity/blob/4c32177ef3f4521c66...

Some explanation of what's happening here:

The initial poster posted this link: https://github.com/paritytech/parity/blob/master/js/src/cont...

Where "master" is the branch which normally has the latest code. And #L216 automatically scrolls down to the 216th line.

The issue is that line isn't permanent since the code in the master branch is subject to change. So in order to make a reliable link, you can link to the ref [1].

Like this: https://github.com/paritytech/parity/blob/4c32177ef3f4521c66...

You could also do it with the short ref (4c32177e): https://github.com/paritytech/parity/blob/4c32177e/js/src/co...

Normally you'd have to scroll up to the top right of the document and grab the short form it, e.g. "6b0e4f9" and replace it with master. Note that's only the ref of the last change for that blob (file) [2].

If you click the line number on a GitHub file, it will add the #LineNumber to your URL.

From there, press Y, this will replace master with the latest commit of the repo.

[1] https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Internals-Git-References

[2] https://git-scm.com/book/en/v2/Git-Internals-Git-Objects

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#435
post #361

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's closest to the middle, assuming that you meant that you're stating the properties that you want to test. It does more than that, but at its base that's effectively how it works so it's close enough for a solid intuition. We're working on a paper about it now -- or at least a sub-paper in the clutch of papers that pertain to a public chain version -- that I'll link to when it's out (a couple weeks probably).

Oh. Dear? (I mean, I understand the pressures of academia, but... ridiculously bad timing, yeah?)

Why bad timing? This is really just an example that while safe smart contracts are technically possible using Solidity/EVM, it's practically impossible. "One of the best Solidity devs" just failed to write a safe contract to the tune of a $30M exploit. Given that, what chance does anyone else have?

At some point, it's time to blame the tool and not the user. Moreover, it's not like people didn't see this coming, myself included[1]. I mean, who really thought that basically taking JavaScript and swapping out the DOM for a bank account wasn't going to end badly? But then again, maybe I've spent too much time at in the SEC/finance where "move fast and break things" engineering gets you shown the door quite quickly. That mantra's fine for a number of domains but finance isn't one of them as one bug can bankrupt the company (see: knight capital).

It really just underlines the need for a safer/better approach. Formal Verification has to be part of that story. A language that was designed with safety in mind has to be another part.

Also, not an academic (yet at least). Cofounder here: http://kadena.io

[1]: https://goldsilverbitcoin.com/jp-morgans-blockchain-research...

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#436
post #431
post #407

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> But if banks and major retailers who have huge budgets can get hacked, of course we can too. Here's the thing: banks and major retailers can't get hacked. At least, not in the sense you're using "hacked". When Target's credit card systems were compromised, resulting in the CEO resigning and and about $300M in costs to the company to deal with the breach, not one customer lost a penny. When $171M from Union Bank of…

From this and your previous comments, I am trying to figure out your basic point. Would you summarize it as, "I have a low tolerance for financial risk and others should think as I do"?

I don't think that's a good way to summarize my point - I have expressed no opinion about financial risk, either my own or others. (Did you mean to address someone else?)

However, whatever financial risk you would like to tolerate, you should make sure you're pursuing goals that do in fact match that financial risk, and that you're not concluding that something more or less risky than it is because you are uninformed. Also, if you are tolerating increased risk, you should do so because there is a purpose for it (e.g, better potential upside), not because high financial risk seems inherently cool. It isn't, and I will certainly defend that point, but it's just a lemma on the way to my actual point.

Arguing that it's okay that cryptocurrencies are hackable because the traditional financial system is hackable is simply factually incorrect: it's a misunderstanding of why the existing financial system looks the way it does, and why its risk tolerances are built the way it is (not a lot done to secure transactions, but a lot done to be able to reverse transactions if needed).

If you really want a simple point out of me, I think G. K. Chesterton made it in 1929:

> In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, "I don't see the use of this; let us clear it away." To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: "If you don't see the use of it, I certainly won't let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it."

If you do not understand the existing financial system, you cannot honestly claim that your new one is better. First figure out how it works and why, and get that right, then you can describe how your changes are improvements.

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#437
post #407

Earlier quoted context omitted.

i know that you're not really serious when you generalize against all of us crypto simpletons, but anytime theres a stupid amount of money on the table people are bound to rush to pick it up. and that means mistakes. the work being done on public blockchains is unlike anything else done before. You don't have he luxury of keeping your db behind a vpn running on a vm platform secured and maintained by the worlds large…

> But if banks and major retailers who have huge budgets can get hacked, of course we can too. Here's the thing: banks and major retailers can't get hacked. At least, not in the sense you're using "hacked". When Target's credit card systems were compromised, resulting in the CEO resigning and and about $300M in costs to the company to deal with the breach, not one customer lost a penny. When $171M from Union Bank of…

I'm inclined to agree but I must say this traditional system is unscalable. Sure it can detect millions of dollars of fraudulent transactions, but what if it's a single person who's the victim of identity theft and lost just a few thousand dollars? A few thousand dollars is nothing in the grand scheme of things but they are a lot to a single individual.

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#438

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I wish I could see how the op is employing the no true Scotsman fallacy, but I can't.

https://twitter.com/SatoshiLite/status/887781929726038016 "If the creator of Solidity, Gavin Wood, cannot write a secure multisig wallet in Solidity, pretty much confirms Ethereum is hacker paradise."

Charlie is trolling. The architect isn't going to be the best craftsman, that requires very different set of skills.

Parity devs may be academically brilliant, and they put out a fantastic client, but the wallet issue shows how lax their development lifecycle has been.

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#439
post #407

Earlier quoted context omitted.

i know that you're not really serious when you generalize against all of us crypto simpletons, but anytime theres a stupid amount of money on the table people are bound to rush to pick it up. and that means mistakes. the work being done on public blockchains is unlike anything else done before. You don't have he luxury of keeping your db behind a vpn running on a vm platform secured and maintained by the worlds large…

> But if banks and major retailers who have huge budgets can get hacked, of course we can too. Here's the thing: banks and major retailers can't get hacked. At least, not in the sense you're using "hacked". When Target's credit card systems were compromised, resulting in the CEO resigning and and about $300M in costs to the company to deal with the breach, not one customer lost a penny. When $171M from Union Bank of…

[deleted]

Re: 153k Ether Stolen in Parity Multi-Sig Attack

#440

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Well then ethereum is not for THOSE people. It is fine if you don't like those features. But it turns out that a lot of people DO want them. The people who want to court system can already use the court system. Now we just have more options and choices.

Why do you think that the court system somehow doesn't apply to what happens on ethereum ?

The courts can certainly make an attempt to apply themselves to what happens on ethereum.

But if someone wants to, they can make it extremely for that to happen.

Good luck finding the anonymous contract creator that set up their contract by sending money through Monero.

Also, empirically, your claim that courts will get involved with ethereum smart contracts just isn't true.

It is not true, because gigantic scandals and contract theft have ALREADY happened on ethereum, and the courts haven't been able to do shit.

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