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Seems old pagers were replaced last month at the American University of Beirut. It may or may not have to do with this operation, but the timing seems very suspect. Those devices may have been tampered with explosives at some point before being distributed to the victims. https://x.com/gazanotice/status/1836082218805891360
probably unrelated, lebanon is a big place
You’re not targeting pacemakers embedded only in the chest cavities of known Hezbollah militants but devices often left around family and children. Hezbollah is a massive political entity with probably more non-combatants than combatants. The pagers are used by accountants, doctors, civil salarymen, it workers, and others that are not legal targets under IHL.
EDIT:
Source: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/sep/17/middle-ea...
> Among those killed is an eight-year-old girl from Bekka Valley, Abiad said, according to Al Jazeera.
> At least 2,800 people have been wounded, he added, and more than 200 are in critical condition.
If we try to do what we are best at here at HN, let’s focus the discussion on the technical aspects of it. It immediately reminded me of Stuxnet, which also from a technical perspective was quite interesting. I already wonder if this was anything that was planted in the devices perviously, or if the ones responsible had similar devices, and managed reverse engineer them and craft a payload to them, that could be sent…
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Future maximum-security states may just require every mobile phone to have an explosive charge pre-installed, with the detonation-codes only available to the authorities, of course.
Then when they detect a device in active use by a [terrorist|child-pornographer|subversive|tax-evader], ka-blewie! Problem solved at the press of a button.
See also: 'Black Mirror' s3e6, 'Hated in the Nation'
From Israel's perspective, this supply chain attack was undoubtedly a clever move, but I can't help but wonder about its long-term consequences. Although it was aimed at harming Israel's adversaries, third-party countries may now hesitate to involve Israel in their supply chains. There's also the risk that other major producers could replicate this tactic, potentially leading to further escalation in the region or be…
Reminds me of two things: 1. Mossad killed the chief bombmaker of Hamas with an exploding phone in 1996: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yahya_Ayyash 2. My grandma used to say not to wear my phone on me, especially close to my heart or my balls, because she thought it was dangerous somehow. Turns out she was right!
From Israel's perspective, this supply chain attack was undoubtedly a clever move, but I can't help but wonder about its long-term consequences. Although it was aimed at harming Israel's adversaries, third-party countries may now hesitate to involve Israel in their supply chains. There's also the risk that other major producers could replicate this tactic, potentially leading to further escalation in the region or be…
> From Israel's perspective, this supply chain attack was undoubtedly a clever move From The Guardian [1]: > Eight killed and 2,750 wounded Was that a clever move if you're killing "only" 8 potential adversaries? [1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2024/sep/17/middle-ea...
And you thought "Key Escrow" or "Chat Control" was bad! Future maximum-security states may just require every mobile phone to have an explosive charge pre-installed, with the detonation-codes only available to the authorities, of course. Then when they detect a device in active use by a [terrorist|child-pornographer|subversive|tax-evader], ka-blewie! Problem solved at the press of a button. See also: 'Black Mirror' s…
>>GoaChronicle through its intelligence network has learned that Israeli intelligence successfully intercepted a shipment of pager batteries that had been ordered from B&H Photo. The order was placed from Lebanon. Acting on a confirmed tip, the intelligence agency seized the shipment and covertly modified the batteries. Small, undetectable explosives known as Kiska 3 were inserted into the battery casings and connected to the battery wires via a discreet chip. The pager model was Rugged Pager AR924 IP67. The operation code word was ‘Below the Belt’.