I don't think there are many people who disagree with me that there's been a huge amount of unwarranted snark recently. The uProxy release for example. Don't compare that with using words like "stupid".
>no more anything where I end up putting my personal data or my clients' data anywhere but on my dedicated servers
The probability that your servers would be compromised by actual damaging threats (hackers, malware, viruses, botnets) is far higher than that of Google, so I hope if your servers get hacked, you will similarly berate yourself and not make excuses that you should have done better and spent 10x more security than you are now. How many actual penetrations have occured of Google infrastructure where thieves (not government) made off with actual information that they'd put to damaging use, vs that of other smaller hosts? Everything you do has tradeoffs.
You keep making hand wave arguments about what Google could have or should have done, again, totally points about the threat models and historical context. When this program started, by some accounts in 2007, the vast majority of Web traffic wasn't even secured by HTTPS, no one was using channel-ID or forward security, and the majority of SMTP traffic was not protected by TLS. In fact, even today, only 50% of email traffic is TLS protected. In 2007, fewer Google services were probably multi-datacenter replicated as well. Encrypting the dark fiber would have been useless back then when the front door was left unlocked.
So, let's try to imagine a hypothetical conversation of some security engineers when new data centers got set up for replication:
Engineer #1: Dude, we should encrypt traffic on our inter-DC traffic.
Engineer #2: It's a buried dark fiber.
Engineer #1: Yeah, but the NSA could dig it up and tap it.
Engineer #2: That's illegal, and besides, it's a theoretical threat. We have a bigger practical threat, right now, anyone could just tap all front-end traffic, because most incoming user traffic is not HTTPS.
Engineer #1: You're right, let's get everyone on HTTPS first. Let's upgrade browsers, and Chrome, with better cipher suites. Let's add Channel-ID. Let's try to get SMTP users to use TLS.
The point isn't about excuses, it's about understanding at each point in time, what the weakest link in the chain is. The NSA taps of your email traffic might be worrisome, but the reality is, the Russians slurping up your credit cards, passwords, and doing MITM's to install botnets have far greater, actual practical damaging effects on you and your customers.
In an ideal world, everything would be secured against all possible attacks from day one, but internet infrastructure is rarely ideal. I started on the internet in the 80s in an era with zero encryption and where many services didn't even have passwords. We have gradually made things more and more secure, but getting there is going to take time. It's unfortunate that Google's efforts to secure it's fiber didn't happen a few years earlier, but if they did happen a few years earlier, it wouldn't have a made a difference, because upstream attacks were far more effective back then.