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GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

bleepingcomputer.com

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Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#411

Note that VS Code is built on Electron and it is a pain to sandbox because Electron has (had?) SUID sandbox helper, and you cannot run SUID binaries in sandbox easily. Sandboxing on Linux is extremely difficult task.

> Sandboxing on Linux is extremely difficult task. Which is really insane when you think about it. Plan 9 had this sorted out decades ago.

With no disrespect to the Linux kernel programmers who are vastly better than I’ll ever be.

Plan 9 was designed, Linux accreted.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#412

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Because centralized management of resources is the death of innovation, intrinsic motivation and speed? The dreaded "process" to get a single tool registered, working and allowed, is the reason a company is slow, dysfunctional and usually failing at a task. The security tax and speeding tickets on everything are a luxury destroying much value.

This is the new old way. This was fine before irresponsible use of AI. Between vibe coding and using AI to find vulnerabilities as a result of vibes, I'm afraid that we will have to find ways to have more controlled environments.

It seems likely that some companies where the trade off shifts will head in that direction.

The problem with controlled environments is that even when done sensibly by people with good intentions they do slow things down and a lot of orgs will decide the trade off isn’t worth that.

I’ve worked for companies that did have much more controlled environments but given everything is made of a thousand packages these days and those packages have CVE’s and you do need to patch doing it after the fact is a recipe for paralysis.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#413
post #369

I've been telling less computer literate folks not to install random stuff since the nineties, and I can't understand how many devs are doing just that these days. I used to work in security auditing, and it makes me feel pretty jaded to think of the gigabytes upon gigabytes of random stuff that just gets pulled in from everywhere in IDEs, package managers, build pipelines and container images. At least back then the…

So you've been telling companies to stop using CI/CD too right?

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#414
Working hard on the github killer. Fully decentralized with nearly unbreakable release system. Multiple parties need to produce the same artifacts in the release workflow. IKA then signs the release on the network side, you sign your release using hardware token. Release pipeline analysis source code for malware on the complete dependency chain. Rust + Nix + SUI + WALRUS + SEAL + IKA - a complete decentralized economy. A few more weeks until testnet :)

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#415
post #374
post #369

I've been telling less computer literate folks not to install random stuff since the nineties, and I can't understand how many devs are doing just that these days. I used to work in security auditing, and it makes me feel pretty jaded to think of the gigabytes upon gigabytes of random stuff that just gets pulled in from everywhere in IDEs, package managers, build pipelines and container images. At least back then the…

Answer: Because the "random stuff" (plugins for VS Code and other IDEs) solves real problems and nothing bad happens most of the time. Almost no manager will sign-off spending time on building stuff in-house if its available "for free". This is also in no way a new thing. How much code was written in notepad++ in the '00ies? Did anyone bother to check if the plugins did sth. malicious? We also used some weird closed-…

This is how you end up with the total dumpster fire known as npm.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#416
post #414

Working hard on the github killer. Fully decentralized with nearly unbreakable release system. Multiple parties need to produce the same artifacts in the release workflow. IKA then signs the release on the network side, you sign your release using hardware token. Release pipeline analysis source code for malware on the complete dependency chain. Rust + Nix + SUI + WALRUS + SEAL + IKA - a complete decentralized econom…

Use those few weeks to write a proper product description and pitch, because I just read your entire paragraph and am no closer to understanding what you're building.

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#417

I really hope this pushes Microsoft to add a explicit permission system to VS Code extensions, and improve security of dev containers.

Oh, you mean like only extensions approved by MS can be published? Similarly to Google, Apple, Mozilla and others?

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#419
post #369

I've been telling less computer literate folks not to install random stuff since the nineties, and I can't understand how many devs are doing just that these days. I used to work in security auditing, and it makes me feel pretty jaded to think of the gigabytes upon gigabytes of random stuff that just gets pulled in from everywhere in IDEs, package managers, build pipelines and container images. At least back then the…

The vast majority of devs in the last few years have either been raised as sloppers or transitioned from developers to sloppers. Programming has evolved into a blackbox where fewer than ever people know how a program works, despite the numbers of "programmers" has skyrocketed. Just a few months ago a friend had a job interview(fake one obviously) where he was asked to clone a repo and do some stuff on it. The repo co…

What are “vs code hooks” exactly? A search for that or “VSCode Hooks” isn’t turning up anything for me in Kagi or Google…

Re: GitHub confirms breach of 3,800 repos via malicious VSCode extension

#420
post #414

Working hard on the github killer. Fully decentralized with nearly unbreakable release system. Multiple parties need to produce the same artifacts in the release workflow. IKA then signs the release on the network side, you sign your release using hardware token. Release pipeline analysis source code for malware on the complete dependency chain. Rust + Nix + SUI + WALRUS + SEAL + IKA - a complete decentralized econom…

Use those few weeks to write a proper product description and pitch, because I just read your entire paragraph and am no closer to understanding what you're building.

I have build a proper workflow system for complex work that composes environments from nix flakes (very extended flakes) - it allows you to combines deterministic with agentic steps. The release process is a workflow in your project that requires to generate reproducible outputs - nix does this for you. The network basically is a distributed CI system - Multiple parties need to check and build your release. When all parties agree, that the package is correct, the SUI smart contract gives it's go. IKA is a multi party encryption network which implements a novel MCP-2pc algorithm. Your release key is split in half - IKA has one part, you have the other. Only is both parties sign the transaction, your software package gets release. Every party, even your PC can be compromised, and it is very hard to just release malware in your package. The whole release pipeline needs to succeed ant then you need to sign it with your hardware token. There are mandatory workflows in the release pipeline that check your software for side loading, comparing your dependency tree to the last version published, etc.

It is the largest project I have ever build and I code since 25 years.

I was just not satisfied with the agentic tools out there, nor with the CI / build infrastructure. Nix is nice, but the way packages are build / signed is just half way to perfect.

We can be lucky that the github hack did not infect the CI infrastructure. Imagine you infect the compilers in github CI to add a sleeper worm that does nothing for a month...

Only if you have multiple parties, building the same software with bootstrapped compilers and every artifact is hash compared, you can be sure it is legit

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