Please don't bring attestation to common Linux distributions. This technology, by essence, moves trust to a third party distinct of the user. I don't see how it can be useful in any way to end users like most of us here. Its use by corporations has already caused too much damage and exclusion in the mobile landscape, and I don't want folks like us becoming pariahs in our own world, just because we want machines we bo…
Please do, I disagree with this commenter. You already trust third parties, but there is no reason why that third party can't be the very same entity publishing the distribution. The role corporations play in attestation for the devices you speak of can be displaced by an open source developer, it doesn't need to require a paid certificate, just a trusted one. Furthermore, attestation should be optional at the hardwa…
Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
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Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#402People demonize attestation. They should keep in mind that far from enslaving users, attestation actually enables some interesting, user-beneficial software shapes that wouldn't be possible otherwise. Hear me out. Imagine you're using a program hosted on some cloud service S. You send packets over the network; gears churn; you get some results back. What are the problems with such a service? You have no idea what S i…
To be honest, mainly companies need that. personal users do not need that. And additionally companies are NOT restrained by governments not to exploit customers as much as possible.
So... i also see it as enslaving users. And tell me, for many private persons, where does this actually give them for PRIVATE persons, NOT companies a net benefit?
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#403Earlier quoted context omitted.
here is some actual security: encrypted /boot, encrypted everything other than the boot loader (grub in this case) sign grub with your own keys (some motherboards let you to do so). don't let random things signed by microsoft to boot (it defeats the whole point) so you have grub in an efi partition, it passes secure boot, loads, and attempts to unlock a luks partition with the user provided passphrase. if it passed s…
Doing secure boot properly is kind of difficult. There are a bunch of TPM measurement registers for various bits and bobs (kernel, initramfs, cmdline, lots more). Using UKIs simplifies it a lot, but it’s not trivial to do right at the moment.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#404The typical HN rage-posting about DRM aside, there's no reason that remote attestation can't be used in the opposite direction: to assert that a server is running only the exact code stack it claims to be, avoiding backdoors. This can even be used with fully open-source software, creating an opportunity for OSS cloud-hosted services which can guarantee that the OSS and the build running on the server match. This is a…
avoiding backdoors as a private person you always can only solve with having the hardware at your place, because hardware ALWAYS can have backdoors, because hardware vendors do not fix their shit.
From my point of view it ONLY gives control and possibilities to large organizations like governments and companies. which in turn use it to control citizens
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#405Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#406Earlier quoted context omitted.
half of the founders of this thing come from Microsoft. I suppose this makes the answer to your question obvious.
My thoughts exactly. We're probably witnessing the beginning of the end of linux users being able to run their own kernels. Soon: - your bank won't let you log in from an "insecure" device. - you won't be able to play videos on an "insecure" device. - you won't be able to play video games on an "insecure" device. And so on, and so forth.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#407Please don't bring attestation to common Linux distributions. This technology, by essence, moves trust to a third party distinct of the user. I don't see how it can be useful in any way to end users like most of us here. Its use by corporations has already caused too much damage and exclusion in the mobile landscape, and I don't want folks like us becoming pariahs in our own world, just because we want machines we bo…
Please do, I disagree with this commenter. You already trust third parties, but there is no reason why that third party can't be the very same entity publishing the distribution. The role corporations play in attestation for the devices you speak of can be displaced by an open source developer, it doesn't need to require a paid certificate, just a trusted one. Furthermore, attestation should be optional at the hardwa…
I would love to use that technology to do reverse attestation, and require the server that handles my personal data to behave a certain way, like obeying the privacy policy terms of the EULA and not using my data to train LLMs if I so opted out. Something tells me that's not going to happen...
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#408I can see like a 100 ways this can make computing worse for 99% people and like 1-2 scenarios where it might actually be useful.
Like if the politicians pushing for chat control/on device scanning of data come knocking again and actually go through (they can try infinitely) tech like this will really be "useful". Oops your device cannot produce a valid attestation, no internet for you.
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#409"Those who give up freedom for security deserve neither."
Re: Lennart Poettering, Christian Brauner founded a new company
#410My only experience with Linux secure boot so far.... I wasn't even aware that it was secure booted. And I needed to run something (I think it was the Displaylink driver) that needs to jam itself into the kernel. And the convoluted process to do it failed (it's packaged for Ubuntu but I was installing it on a slightly outdated Fedora system). What, this part is only needed for secure boot? I'm not sec... oh. So go bac…
Secure Boot only extends the chain of trust from your firmware down the first UEFI binary it loads. Currently SB is effectively useless because it will at best authenticate your kernel but the initrd and subsequent userspace (including programs that run as root) are unverified and can be replaced by malicious alternatives. Secure Boot as it stands right now in the Linux world is effectively an annoyance that’s only t…