Claude for Chrome seems to be walking right into the "lethal trifecta." https://simonwillison.net/2025/Jun/16/the-lethal-trifecta/ "The lethal trifecta of capabilities is:" • Access to your private data —one of the most common purposes of tools in the first place! • Exposure to untrusted content —any mechanism by which text (or images) controlled by a malicious attacker could become available to your LLM • The abilit…
So far the accepted approach is to wrap all prompts in a security prompt that essentially says "please don't do anything bad". > Prompt guardrails to prevent jailbreak attempts and ensure safe user interactions without writing a single line of code. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41864014 > - Inclusion prompt: User's travel preferences and food choices - Exclusion prompt: Credit card details, passport number, S…
See also CaMeL https://simonwillison.net/2025/Apr/11/camel/ which incorporates a type system to track tainted data from the Quarantined LLM, ensuring that the Privileged LLM can't even see tainted data until it's been reviewed by a human user. (But this can induce user fatigue as the user is forced to manually approve all the data that the Privileged LLM can access.)