Earlier quoted context omitted.
Telegram doesn't use end-to-end encryption by default and likely never will. Paul Durov has been quite hostile against that feature in the past. So yes, choose Signal over Telegram. I find that instead of trying to convince friends/family to use Signal I just tell them "use Signal as your default SMS app" or install it myself for them. This tactic worked well in the Internet Explorer/Firefox and then Chrome transitio…
This is good advice. I would to those following it that this advice is likely most useful if your family members are on Android devices. iOS does not allow you to change the default SMS application and if your family member is on iOS, the iMessage platform lock in is nearly impossible to break out of.
I don't trust Signal
401–410 of 473 posts
Re: I don't trust Signal
#402Some version of this post seems to circulate every few months or so. This one is more direct in its accusations of Moxie acting in bad faith. I think this is disingenuous. Moxie has been very clear[0] about the tradeoffs that Signal has made and the reasons for them. It's fine to be dissatisfied with those choices. It's another thing entirely to accuse Moxie of dissimulating. Personally, I'd like to see Signal replac…
Agreed, though personally I find any support of animated gifs in the year 2010 and beyond to be counterproductive.
Without emoji and animated gifs, I suspect 70% of my Signal contacts wouldn't use it at all. It's hard enough to convince some of my friends to use it at all, "Can't I just Facebook message you?"
For me, amongst my group of friends - it seems Moxy is making all the right security/usability tradeoffs.
If you don't trust PlayStore, it seems not much of a jump to say you also shouldn't trust Android.
If you're _rightly_ that concerned (and I'll note that Snowden recommends Signal, so I wonder what it is you're up to that makes you more of a nation-state target than him), I don't have a clue what your options are - I suspect they start with "don't use the internet at all"...
Re: I don't trust Signal
#403Re: I don't trust Signal
#404Earlier quoted context omitted.
The permissions system that android apps use is entirely dependent on which API version you target. Last I understood, if you made a new app today and purposely chose to target an old API version, you could force it to use the "all or nothing", user hostile permissions query you described
I believe Google is asking developers to support a recent API version to push updates to the Play Store.
https://developer.android.com/distribute/best-practices/deve...
@mrguyorama - this means you can force the old landgrab user-hostile permissions to people running old Android versions, but you cannot force them onto users running Android 8.
Re: I don't trust Signal
#405If the consequences of sending messages are torture and death, I wouldn't trust any form of electronic communication. That's what face to face meetings are for and have always been for. I did not think signal is insecure, but either party could be compromised in other ways like a key logger or other local software that intercepts messages on the device they are composed on. I certainly wouldn't trust any mobile os ba…
You have to consider that face to face meetings are often observed by third parties, you can be tracked easily, extremely incriminating generally. The other person can talk, and provide evidence of your location. In comparison, sending a signal message is comparatively covert.
Re: I don't trust Signal
#406Earlier quoted context omitted.
> that's the unique instant messaging that has FOSS'ed both the server and the clients. Signal's server code is open source as well: https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Server And apparently the client can verify that the server is running that code: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/#trust-but...
Note: my understanding of SGX is that this still requires trust of Intel. Still, far better than nothing
Re: I don't trust Signal
#407Earlier quoted context omitted.
You conveniently left out the fact that Telegram has a history of actual backdoors http://habrahabr.ru/post/206900/
This is completely unrelated to what I said.
You suggest that this is the major difference between Signal and Telegram, but that's dishonest at best.
Re: I don't trust Signal
#408Adjunct to the rest of this discussion: just read through that GH issue and came away with markedly different conclusions than the author of the blog post.
It reads like someone who is trying hard to justify and prioritize dev time/resourcing in the face of what is a demanding and vitriolic minority. No evidence of disingenuous intent or desire to push a particular agenda. I see nothing that would have prevented the old OSS adage: "if you want to see it, do it".
Drew, I don't know you, or the background for the argument you're making, but it seems like you have something stuck in your craw here. Maybe take a little time and try to view the situation with fresh eyes? You're obviously passionate about this subject -- and the unique perspective is appreciated -- but it devalues the rest of the info presented, and I don't buy the precept you're proposing.
Re: I don't trust Signal
#409Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It seems pretty odd to me to distrust someone because they ... ... are using a platform "you" don't trust. Really? That's not really odd. At least, it's not odd, if that usage and what it entails is the denominating part of the persona in this question.
Whats odd is calling a application "not secure" because it uses the platform's software distribution channel. Here's a thought. If you are so concerned about the NSA that you think Google's cloud is a problem, why are you running the OS developed by Google?
Re: I don't trust Signal
#410Earlier quoted context omitted.
The Core Secrets leak said the FBI "compels" U.S. companies to "SIGINT-enable" their products if they don't take money. SIGINT-enable means installing backdoors. So, yeah they can. They also do this with classification order mandating secrecy from organizations and people that are immune to prosecution. In the Lavabit case, they wanted a device attached to the network to do whatever they wanted with the company order…
That is a major accusation, can you provide source(s) to read more about this claim? It is at odds with known cases, such as the fight with Apple over iPhone encryption.
Now, first indication this isn't true was Alexander and Clapper saying they didn't collect massive data on Americans. If they did, they could've solved a lot of cases by your logic of action vs capability being contradictory, right? Yet, Snowden leaks showed they were collecting everything they could: not just metadata, not just on terrorism, and were sharing it with various LEO's. So, they already lie at that point to hide massive collection even if it means crooks walking.
Next, we have the umbrella program called Core Secrets. See Sentry Owl or "relationships with industry." It says Top Secret, Compartmented Programs are doing "SIGINT-enabling programs with U.S. companies." In same document, even those with TS clearance aren't allowed to know the ECI-classified fact that specific companies are weakening products to facilitate attacks.
https://theintercept.com/2014/10/10/core-secrets/
https://theintercept.com/document/2014/10/10/national-initia...
For Lavabit trial, see Exhibit 15 and 16 for the defense against pen register. Exhibit 17 makes clear the device they attach records data live and claims constitutional authority to order that. They claim only metadata but they lied about that before. Exhibit 18 upholds that the government is entitled to the information, Lavabit has to install the backdoor, the court trusts FBI not to abuse it, and they'll all lie to Lavabit customers that nobody has access to their messages (aka secrecy order about keys).
https://edwardsnowden.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/redacte...
That the judge asked for a specific alternative was hopeful, though. I came up with a high-assurance, lawful-intercept concept as a backup option for event where there was no avoiding an intercept but you wanted provable limitation of what they were doing.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/fake_cell_pho...
They regularly hide what techniques they have via parallel construction or dropping cases.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intel...
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/fbi-would-rather...
So, you now have that backdrop where they're collecting everything, can fine companies out of existence, can jail their executives for contempt, are willing to let defendants walk to protect their secret methods, and constantly push for more power in overt methods. In the iPhone case, even Richard Clarke said he and everyone he knows believed the NSA could've cracked it. Even he, previously ardent defender of intelligence community, says FBI was trying to establish a precedent to let them bypass the crypto with legal means in regular courts.
https://www.newsweek.com/former-white-house-offiical-nsa-cou...
So, the questions would be:
(a) can they already do that legally or technically using methods like attaching hardware and software to vendors' networks/apps like in Lavabit trial?
(b) can the NSA or third parties bypass the security on iPhones publicly or in secret? Or did Apple truly make bulletproof security?
(c) did all this change just because FBI said they were honest, powerless agency hampered by unbreakable security in a press release?
I didn't think anything changed. I predicted they'd crack that iPhone the second they were blocked in court. They did. They knew they could the whole time. They lied the whole time. They wanted a precedent to expand their power like they did in the past. That simple.