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TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

volatility-labs.blogspot.com

41–50 of 75 posts

Re: TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

#41

Would it help to store a long string of data in memory, say 10mb. Then place the key somewhere in the middle of it? The placement could be based on the password. Just an idea..

It would not help. Volatility is not doing any searching, instead it is reading TC's data structures in memory to find the key. Basically replicating TC's algos offline.

Re: TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

#42
post #30

A naive person googling about TrueCrypt and stumbling on this article (well written with an authoritative tone) will think that TrueCrypt is completely cracked, and not bother to use it. This research is interesting and useful, but do we really want to scare off people from using TrueCrypt? Couldn't you add a paragraph at the top or to the side that says, for example: "If TrueCrypt is used in the intended way, i.e.,…

Can't Truecrypt secure erase sensitive data they keep in the RAM, say by overwriting the variables with random noise, when a volume is dismounted?

If so, I'd say anyone who participates in Truecrypt's development is also intended audience.

Re: TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

#43
post #26
post #6

The new era of encryption will be marked not by making existing encryption solutions more secure, but by concealing the very act of existence of encrypted data. "Here's my data but you cannot read it" - does not runs so well with courts, high stakes competitors and deep pocketed enemies. Once it is known "what to crack" the "how to" solution will be found. "Rubber hose cryptography" is one of these :) If you're not p…

By the way, this is exactly why the NSA will not catch many terrorists. You can always hide data and you can always hide communication (which is just data written and read by two different endpoints).

Spying on terrorists is just a red herring to keep public calm about it. I don't think NSA really cares about it, there are far more valuable benefits of spying.

Re: TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

#44
post #30

A naive person googling about TrueCrypt and stumbling on this article (well written with an authoritative tone) will think that TrueCrypt is completely cracked, and not bother to use it. This research is interesting and useful, but do we really want to scare off people from using TrueCrypt? Couldn't you add a paragraph at the top or to the side that says, for example: "If TrueCrypt is used in the intended way, i.e.,…

Yes and no. On one hand, we want to specify that it's not vulnerable, on the other, it is important to discuss this thoroughly. Ensure that people can understand the ramifications of this discovery - short of doing nothing, nothing is less secure than using security software "badly", or "incorrectly" - that false visage of security can be deceptive and lead to other bad practices.

I just noticed that the author commented that he attempted to add some clarity to this effect.

Re: TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

#45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I am not following you. Concealing? do you mean physically hiding the media on which it is stored? Like a flash chip in a tie clasp? If you mean concealing as in hidden partitions, data streams, or digital Stenography - these are all easily detectable upon close inspection. If there is extra bits where none are expected, this becomes a giveaway. Perhaps enough misdirection and a custom strategy of hiding could furthe…

TrueCrypt offers a volume-within-a-volume option. The free space of a volume normally contains random data, and the hidden volume is presumably headerless. The idea is then to put something that you might want to hide in the outer volume (freaky porn, for example), then put your actual secrets (evidence of your criminal enterprise, for example) in the hidden volume. If forced to disclose the password, then only the o…

The bit that's never made sense to me about that is that the attacker is equally aware of this feature of TrueCrypt. Once you've given the password for the outer volume, wouldn't the attacker just keep on with the rubber hose until you've also given the password for the inner volume? Obviously, she can't prove that there is an inner volume and she might just be wasting her time. On the other hand, you can't prove that there is NOT an inner volume, so it's in the attacker's best interest to just keep up the torture until either the attacker has enough keys that the encrypted data size equals that of the entire TrueCrypt volume or you've been killed by the rubber hose.

If we believe that torture would cause me to disclose the password of a file without a hidden volume, wouldn't it be just as effective at getting me to give the password to my hidden volume?

Re: TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

#47
post #30

A naive person googling about TrueCrypt and stumbling on this article (well written with an authoritative tone) will think that TrueCrypt is completely cracked, and not bother to use it. This research is interesting and useful, but do we really want to scare off people from using TrueCrypt? Couldn't you add a paragraph at the top or to the side that says, for example: "If TrueCrypt is used in the intended way, i.e.,…

The addition you're recommending is somewhat orthogonal to the article. The update at the end of the article clarifies that all one must do, strictly speaking, to protect against the weakness they describe is to power the computer down. If an adversary is knocking down your door, it's seems more important to get the keys out of RAM than to first ensure filesystem and OS integrity by saving/dismounting and cleanly shutting down.

Re: TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

#49
post #40

An advantage you gain right off the bat is that patterns in AES keys can be distinguished from other seemingly random blocks of data. This is how tools like aeskeyfind and bulk_extractor locate the keys in memory dumps, packet captures, etc. In most cases, extracting the keys from RAM is as easy as this: $ ./aeskeyfind Win8SP0x86.raw Shouldn't it be possible to store an AES key in a way that's indistinguishable from…

I hope linking to reddit doesn't get me banned, but this question was asked there and explained nicely:

http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/1va904/truecrypt_mas...

Re: TrueCrypt Master Key Extraction And Volume Identification

#50

Forgive a fool. But are the volatility plugins used (truecryptmaster and truecryptsummary) only provided to students of the official volatility training or is it released somewhere? Can't find it on their Google code page.

right now we are only using them in the class, but in the next Volatility release (2.4) they will be in SVN like all our other ones.
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