Intel In Bed with NSA?
41–50 of 73 posts
Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#42It is really, really hard for me to see this as anything other than utter paranoia. As one of the messages in the thread stated: > Right. How exactly would you backdoor an RNG so (a) it could be effectively used by the NSA when they needed it (e.g. to recover Tor keys), (b) not affect the security of massive amounts of infrastructure, and (c) be so totally undetectable that there'd be no risk of it causing a s tstorm…
> It is really, really hard for me to see this as anything other than utter paranoia. It is really really hard for me to imagine Intel not beeing 100% cooperative with the NSA.
Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
Well, it is documented that the NSA made DES weaker by using less bits for key size (this makes brute forcing easier). I aslo noted that Schiener's AES submission was passed over (I speculate that Rijndael is easier to brute force). The feds used to fight civilian crypto tooth and nail. Then they allowed it, and in one of the crypto books a story was related that the feds were bummed about RSA and friends. The listen…
> The feds used to fight civilian crypto tooth and nail. Curious. I'd like to read about this. Can anyone post any links?
Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#44Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#45Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#46This issue just does not pass the rubber hose test. If the NSA wanted and got a backdoor in intel chips there are so many better ways to do it than introducing a bad hw rng. If you wanted one exploit in the chip, why would you pick a hard to exploit one and user controlled one on top of that? It's classic paranoid thinking: People have a choice to use the hw rng or not. So it becomes a big deal. All the while not add…
Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#47Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It is really, really hard for me to see this as anything other than utter paranoia. It is really really hard for me to imagine Intel not beeing 100% cooperative with the NSA.
You know who else cooperates with the NSA? The Linux community. You know, that whole "SELinux" thing? Yeah, that's an NSA project. Turns out cooperating with the NSA doesn't automatically mean spying on the public, it could instead be hardening crypto security. Which is the NSA's other job, it turns out.
You mean that damned monstrosity I always disable? You're claiming it's not a plot to make Linux utterly unusable?
Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
> It is really, really hard for me to see this as anything other than utter paranoia. It is really really hard for me to imagine Intel not beeing 100% cooperative with the NSA.
There are only two X86 chip manufacturers of note. Intel and AMD both could tell the NSA to get bent.
Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#49It is really, really hard for me to see this as anything other than utter paranoia. As one of the messages in the thread stated: > Right. How exactly would you backdoor an RNG so (a) it could be effectively used by the NSA when they needed it (e.g. to recover Tor keys), (b) not affect the security of massive amounts of infrastructure, and (c) be so totally undetectable that there'd be no risk of it causing a s tstorm…
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Re: Intel In Bed with NSA?
#50The comments about RdRand being impossible to verify because it's on-chip seem quite reasonable. (Although Intel have tried to be quite open about how it works. https://sites.google.com/site/intelrdrand/references ) I have no idea if RdRand is the only source of entropy for /dev/urandom in the kernel these days but that does seem quite silly. Especially as RdRand is documented as having two error conditions, not enou…
>I have no idea if RdRand is the only source of entropy for /dev/urandom in the kernel these days but that does seem quite silly If I understand correctly, the idea is to use RdRand to feed the entropy pool (which is also fed by other noise)[1] from which urandom pulls. So it doesn't seem RdRand would be the sole source of entropy if it were to be used in this context. [1] http://linux.die.net/man/4/urandom
You can buy one of these http://www.entropykey.co.uk/ which are unlikely to be NSA "certified" instead.