Earlier quoted context omitted.
It depends on what you mean by "using TOR right" - and that depends on who/where you are and what you're trying to protect yourself against. A Chinese/Egyptian/Turkish dissident might consider it perfectly sensible to use TOR to access their gmail account - that's a perfectly valid way of hiding from your local (non-US) government and spy agencies.
What I mean by using Tor right, for instance, is avoiding use of certain browser plugins that can potentially give away your location.
On oft-hear piece of advice is to never use an identity you ever use elsewhere over TOR - for me, as a "non US person", even if I can trust TOR and TLS/SSL to ensure the privacy of my data in transit, it doesn't matter if the far end of my connection through TOR ends up at my gmail/apple/facebook/linkedin/twitter/dropbox/yahoo/amazon/any-other-US-affiliated-corporation. Being "non US" and located outside the US means the bar for any "legal requests" those companies receive is _very_ low.
(Hmmm, I wonder if proxying all my web traffic through a vpn with a definitely-in-the-US endpoint might be a worthwhile bit of civil protest? I wonder if tcp connections originating from my Digital Ocean vps in New York and heading to US datacenters have slightly better legal protection or "presumtion of domestic provenance" than tcp connections originating here in Australia? Maybe I should be doing this anyway for all the analytics/ad-tracking web-bugs...)