41–50 of 60 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you get physical access you can also read all the mails in Apple's Mail.app, or any other app on the device. Maybe not using a tool, but you can easily read them in the app, forward them, and send fake e-mails using the account of the user. (edited to make my point more clear :)
Or, you could just... open up Mail.app? and read the emails without a tool haha.
There is a secure store solution available from a company located in germany. They call it "Secure Incremental Store" - an enhancement for Core Data.
Interesting. But Apple provides protection API for Core Data as well as a part of their SDK.
“if anyone else can get hold of your phone, he can access to files of those apps where data is not protected.” As always, if someone has physical access and unlimited time, no device or computer is safe. Also, Mailbox.app only supports GMail. Security minded people are obviously not the target market.
>if someone has physical access and unlimited time There is no such thing as unlimited resources.
If I had unlimited time I could crack every encrypted message on the planet.
Using DPAPI turns a 30 second hack into an online cracking job. The crypto processor in the iPhone can only check one password every ~80ms and you need the chip with you. An attacker cannot do an offline attack.
“if anyone else can get hold of your phone, he can access to files of those apps where data is not protected.” As always, if someone has physical access and unlimited time, no device or computer is safe. Also, Mailbox.app only supports GMail. Security minded people are obviously not the target market.
If you get physical access you can also read all the mails in Apple's Mail.app, or any other app on the device. Maybe not using a tool, but you can easily read them in the app, forward them, and send fake e-mails using the account of the user. (edited to make my point more clear :)
When the device is locked the file is encrypted and cannot be easily retrieved with a USB cable and a file explorer. An app that does not properly secure its files is readable even when the device is locked.
An important fact is wrong: You actually need to unlock the device to access the data unless the iPhone and the computer were paired before.
Then, even if the device is later locked, they can bulk copy unencrypted files using tools like iExplorer, and browse at their leisure.
It's funny how some business class apps store usernames and passwords in clear text in their app sandboxes.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Does that mean that basic security should not be in a company's mind, especially when it comes to the kind of data emails can contain? Mailbox is BIG. We are not talking of an average app here!
Email is not secure. Email has never been secure. Nothing you send over email is secure. There's little authentication and no signing. All this stuff can be kludged onto email, but the attitude should be "unless I've taken measures to add security this thing is not secure".
A basic bit of security, especially one that doesn't put any more load on the user (to have to maintain or set up) is a pretty big no-brainer. Raising the bar for a successful hack is also worth doing when the cost is a single line of code and no effort on the user's part.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Email is not secure. Email has never been secure. Nothing you send over email is secure. There's little authentication and no signing. All this stuff can be kludged onto email, but the attitude should be "unless I've taken measures to add security this thing is not secure".
Sure, but that's also like saying "car accidents are inevitable, so let's not put on our seat belts". A basic bit of security, especially one that doesn't put any more load on the user (to have to maintain or set up) is a pretty big no-brainer. Raising the bar for a successful hack is also worth doing when the cost is a single line of code and no effort on the user's part.
What's on offer here? 10 minutes extra tamper resistance? For a protocol which is inherently insecure?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Sure, but that's also like saying "car accidents are inevitable, so let's not put on our seat belts". A basic bit of security, especially one that doesn't put any more load on the user (to have to maintain or set up) is a pretty big no-brainer. Raising the bar for a successful hack is also worth doing when the cost is a single line of code and no effort on the user's part.
If we're using analogy it's more like telling bicycle riders to use anti-puncture tape. Sure, it'll reduce the chance of getting a puncture but does nothing when they go under a truck. What's on offer here? 10 minutes extra tamper resistance? For a protocol which is inherently insecure?
Sure, if you're the CEO of some big company and a skilled attacker really wants at your email, this is only a stopgap - but this is also sufficient to stop less proficient attackers entirely. For most people this is all they need.
> "it's more like telling bicycle riders to use anti-puncture tape."
If anti-puncture tape has literally no downsides whatsoever to the bicycle rider's experience, and costs nothing, then yes. Why wouldn't you have it?
An important fact is wrong: You actually need to unlock the device to access the data unless the iPhone and the computer were paired before.
You can retrieve data from the device with special equipment after opening the phone. This is beyond the typical "geek". If you jailbreak the phone you can access all non protected data. iOS Mail app uses DAPI correctly. For push mail when the phone is locked it will use a public key to encrypt the data. I am unsure if even the Gmail app uses it correctly, I only tested the stock mail app. If you have the an escrow k…
Citation needed.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
If we're using analogy it's more like telling bicycle riders to use anti-puncture tape. Sure, it'll reduce the chance of getting a puncture but does nothing when they go under a truck. What's on offer here? 10 minutes extra tamper resistance? For a protocol which is inherently insecure?
What's on offer here is the ability to exclude a large class of attackers entirely - script kiddies with a commonly available file explorer tool. Sure, if you're the CEO of some big company and a skilled attacker really wants at your email, this is only a stopgap - but this is also sufficient to stop less proficient attackers entirely. For most people this is all they need. > "it's more like telling bicycle riders to…