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GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

discuss.grapheneos.org

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Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#41

Post by Helmut10001 »

prmoustache wrote: post #40
microtonal wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A replacement for SeedVault is planned: https://grapheneos.org/features#encrypted-backups https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/4687#i...

Neat, I didn't realize it was still included. I thought it had been abandonned. So basically one needs a webdav server somewhere or an usb flash drive.

I use local seedvault backup and then sync via round sync daily trigger to my Nextcloud WebDav Server (native seedvault was not able to use this, for some reason).

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#42

Post by hamper653 »

skitsofrandom wrote: post #38
prmoustache wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A lot of people are still using their smartphone pretty much as a dumbphone with a web browser.

Yeah but if you're a normal guy strolling through every time with a phone that has nothing- no pictures, no signed in email, no history of messages, 4 contacts. That's abnormal, no way of spinning it as "but I just don't use my phone much" will make that seem normal. The average person has their phone glued to their body 24/7 now. Implying that you don't is abnormal.

"I only ever cross borders with a blank phone because I don’t want you invading my privacy" is a perfectly valid answer. You can also add that it is your employer’s policy and/or your government official recommendation.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#43

Post by cromka »

prmoustache wrote: post #9

What GrapheneOS is missing is a complete backup and restore solution so that people can preventively wipe their smartphone before crossing the border. It would be nice to have the possibility to backup/restore every app and their data from an ssh/sftp server the way google/apple users do with google cloud / icloud. I'd rather wipe my smartphone, only add a couple of direct contacts, a copy of my passport and the pdf…

I think more useful would be to be able to boot into another data partition with a different password, which, in turn, would hide the other "daily" partition. I believe LUKS is capable of that. The storage dump looks like a random set of data and only a valid password can find and decrypt a matching hidden partition.

Ideally this should also work on lock screen, e.g. if you type in a non-standard PIN, it would boot from the "dummy" partition in the background, with a slight delay perhaps.

This way you don't have backup anything (I mean you should, but for normal purposes) and have a plausible deniability whenever you get randomly inspected, not just at border crossings that you anticipate.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#44

Post by Terr_ »

hamper653 wrote: post #42
skitsofrandom wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yeah but if you're a normal guy strolling through every time with a phone that has nothing- no pictures, no signed in email, no history of messages, 4 contacts. That's abnormal, no way of spinning it as "but I just don't use my phone much" will make that seem normal. The average person has their phone glued to their body 24/7 now. Implying that you don't is abnormal.

"I only ever cross borders with a blank phone because I don’t want you invading my privacy" is a perfectly valid answer. You can also add that it is your employer’s policy and/or your government official recommendation.

You can also point out that other countries want to search phones too.

"I have to do this because of country X, you know that they're like, amirite?"

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#45

Post by choo-t »

msh wrote: post #34
microtonal wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted. Also worth mentioning that you can set auto-reboot to a shorter period (down to 10 minutes). So if you anticipate situations where your phone can be seized (border crossings, demonstrations), it's worth temporarily setting this to a short time period (or rebooting your phone yourself to ge…

I dont understand why people like a journalist working on things they dont want seized would carry this kind of data on their device at a situation like this (border crossing), I see it as more useful to remove that kind of data from the device first.

Because you may need the data in the data during/after your travel and lack clean way to access safely, securely and anonymously remotely.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#46

Post by dugite-code »

msh wrote: post #34
microtonal wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted. Also worth mentioning that you can set auto-reboot to a shorter period (down to 10 minutes). So if you anticipate situations where your phone can be seized (border crossings, demonstrations), it's worth temporarily setting this to a short time period (or rebooting your phone yourself to ge…

I dont understand why people like a journalist working on things they dont want seized would carry this kind of data on their device at a situation like this (border crossing), I see it as more useful to remove that kind of data from the device first.

Probably because everything seems to be an "app" these days. Even when it has no business being one.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#47

Post by Terr_ »

riedel wrote: post #25
bigyabai wrote: post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Relevant news story: https://www.androidauthority.com/grapheneos-duress-pin-us-pr... According to The Guardian, the US Department of Justice is prosecuting Atlanta resident Samuel Tunick after he allegedly gave a GrapheneOS duress PIN while border agents were trying to search his Google Pixel phone. It sounds like he did give them the password, but it was the password to wiping his phone and not unlocking it. I'm sur…

This is really an interesting case. Hope to see a ruling here. The edge cases are really interesting as well, like the fake pin on the back of the phone. I also wonder generally about the 'destruction' of data Wouldn't the government need to prove that there is no backup, because just making it more difficult (like hiding) would probably not call for the paragraph. Unfortunately for the rest of us the defence is base…

> The edge cases are really interesting as well, like the fake pin on the back of the phone.

"Your honor, I have the real pin memorized because I use it all the time, but since I can never use the duress code, I had to keep it somewhere handy."

Or

"Pickpocketing and phone-snatching is a real problem overseas, I put it there so that criminal would wipe the phone trying to get in, denying them access to things like my bank account."

Heck, those aren't just plausible, they might be a good idea.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#48

Post by muyuu »

There was some comment here somewhere arguing that 16 characters for a password is too little, but that he used the pattern lock. Looks like it was deleted.

Anyway. The pattern lock in Android provides Log2(389112) =~ 18.57 bits of entropy. This is less than 3 random characters, or 4 lowercase letters, or a decimal PIN digit password of 6 characters.

Granted, you could use mnemonics for long passwords, but how convenient is to input those long passwords?

I wonder why don't they just allow for longer passwords and just use a hash digest when it's too long, rather than just disallowing people from using strong passwords that they will remember. This pushes people to reuse passwords, send them to themselves, and other bad practices.

Re: GrapheneOS protections against data extraction from locked devices

#50

Post by podocarp »

microtonal wrote: post #14
rzk wrote: post #4

I think this has been posted in response to this news story [1] to clarify that GrapheneOS has strong protection against data being extracted even without a duress PIN/password. On a related note, a recent article [2] also describes how GrapheneOS helped a journalist protect his work and his confidential sources citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where ke…

citing the 18-hour auto-reboot feature that returns the device to Before First Unlock (BFU) mode, where keys cannot be extracted. Also worth mentioning that you can set auto-reboot to a shorter period (down to 10 minutes). So if you anticipate situations where your phone can be seized (border crossings, demonstrations), it's worth temporarily setting this to a short time period (or rebooting your phone yourself to ge…

What about using decoy profiles? Say before the border crossing you switch to another user. Does that expose keys or anything for other users?
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