Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Xeyes is cute until one considers the practical implications… what's the problem with xeyes? it reads data on your computer and displays it. Just like vim or cat. If, for some reason, you want to run a program that you don't trust, you should sandbox it from the outside . But granting full rights to distro-provided programs like vim or xeyes is perfectly sane. Just like you trust your kernel.
> But granting full rights to distro-provided programs like vim or xeyes is perfectly sane Saying this after the whole XZ utils ordeal has happened is quite interesting. Can you really guarantee that your distro is not compromised? And if it is compromised, how can you easily _discover_ that a program is doing something strange? X11 ( the one that most people are familiar with, not the locked down one with X security…
Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
41–50 of 78 posts
Re: Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
#42Re: Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
#43Xlibre (the only current actively developed implementation of a X11 server) has a new extension - XNamespace to address some challenges as well. https://github.com/X11Libre/xserver/blob/master/doc/Xnamespa...
XWayland is actively developed. XFree86, which is the "standalone DDX" you see on X11 desktops, is being actively maintained.
Re: Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
#44Earlier quoted context omitted.
No, X11 supports pretty detailed per-application access control, similar to selinux (XACE). The author of the phoenix x server has blogged about it, iirc.
> XACE Which is configured by default on what distros?
Basic X client isolation (not using XACE just Xsecurity) would have worked for sandboxed applications with some minor changes (allowing access to some basic modern extensions, I had a local patch for this once). There is really not fundamental issue in X that could now allow isolation of clients.
Re: Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Xeyes is cute until one considers the practical implications… what's the problem with xeyes? it reads data on your computer and displays it. Just like vim or cat. If, for some reason, you want to run a program that you don't trust, you should sandbox it from the outside . But granting full rights to distro-provided programs like vim or xeyes is perfectly sane. Just like you trust your kernel.
> But granting full rights to distro-provided programs like vim or xeyes is perfectly sane Saying this after the whole XZ utils ordeal has happened is quite interesting. Can you really guarantee that your distro is not compromised? And if it is compromised, how can you easily _discover_ that a program is doing something strange? X11 ( the one that most people are familiar with, not the locked down one with X security…
Re: Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nowhere (and everywhere). It is my understanding that XACE doesn't actually provide any security features itself. It just provides the "hooks" to implement security extensions. Like LSM feature in Linux kernel. You have to install a additional X11 extension to do something useful with it. So the most common X11 security extension is going to be xcsecurity which enables the SECURITY extension. It allows a course permi…
except Wayland dropped the baby with the bathtub? for example standardized window management, left as an exercise to the GUI lib and the compositor? and woop woop X11 GUI apps need to be rewritten to support window management on WSL (Wayland based) and the network reconnect on hybernate also broke. But at least Games are faster, aren't they...
Re: Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
#47For an article written late last year I hoped for a little more awareness of how massive a security hole granting full, unfiltered access to the X11 server is. Granted, any sandboxing is better than none, but firefox is one of the few apps that already sandboxes itself really well, and with a blog title like that it might be good to touch upon things like nested X servers such as Xephyr.
Yeah, sadly Firefox and Chrome want almost full privileges so that they can sandbox themselves. X itself always bothers me. Xeyes is cute until one considers the practical implications…
Re: Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
#48Is X11 going to be like IE6. Still around in another 10 years after it was intended to be deprecated across all major distros (2025/2026).
In all seriousness, it is another stark reminder why you never rewrite from the ground up. Especially when you're replacing a foundational technology like the display server. In the same time Microsoft reworked their display driver model twice without requiring a single change from application developers. The Linux world doesn't have that many application developers, we should not be asking them to continually chase newer and newer APIs. A rolling stone gathers no moss.
Re: Enhancing x11 Application Security with LXC (2025)
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem is that Wayland just isn't a compelling alternative for many people, so they don't move. For me, I see no benefit because I got used to avoiding HiDPI and don't have a mixed-DPI workspace. For some bizarre reason they made each compositor implement input-handling separately, so for example artists might have to switch compositor just to use their tablet of choice. And worse yet, some people with input acc…
> I like my cozy Plasma DE [...] clean, all free of ads and bad UI redesigns and AI injected into every corner. Plasma itself is an example of bad UI redesign (but a far cry from Gnome).