This confuses me - why would a proof-of-work anti-scraping system like Anubis prevent registrations?
AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
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Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#42I'll note that OpenSuse also has Packman which a shitton of people enable (for codecs), has also 'one namespace only' an looser policies than the main distro. I do not think this something you can escape by switching distro.
Ubuntu actually has first-party repositories with proprietary codecs.
Nixpkgs is a pretty comprehensive monorepo of packages with a more normal review process than the AUR, and it includes non-free software as well, plus the model with flakes for third-party stuff is that you trust individual publishers for their little repos rather than one giant grab bag repo of unreviewed content like the AUR.
RPMFusion for Fedora kinda has a similar profile, in that it's a shared repo for various things unsuitable for the main one, but it follows more or less normal Fedora packaging and review standards, doesn't it?
Supply chain attacks are possible everywhere and some distros have particular weaknesses, but the AUR really is pretty much uniquely bad here.
Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#43I'll note that OpenSuse also has Packman which a shitton of people enable (for codecs), has also 'one namespace only' an looser policies than the main distro. I do not think this something you can escape by switching distro.
Packman is more akin to rpmfusion, than AUR. OBS is the AUR equivalent for OpenSUSE.
OBS is more like Ubuntu's Launchpad or Fedora's CO0R than the AUR. Random strangers can't take over the packages of others just because they go idle, and it's a bunch of separate repos, not one. Totally different trust model.
Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#44It is so sad that every goodwill eventually got enshittified as well.
Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#45Earlier quoted context omitted.
AUR isn't just the testing repo of Arch; it's explicitly just an open spot where anybody can put up "here's a PKGBUILD for folks". I don't see how it's like either the Nix or Debian examples.
Well, Nix has NUR which is a direct equivalent but it's not nearly as broadly used and I assume "here's a PKGBUILD for folks" is already too permissive for you if you're asking. There's no maintainer vetting process in nixpkgs as far as I know, anyone can own a bunch of packages. There are quality standards and it's not "here's a bunch of nix code for folks" but it's the next possible thing in the line after that.
Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#46Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, the only reason this isn't happening in other distros is simply popularity. Namespacing is the solution, and as mentioned in the article some ditros do indeed have namespaced user repos, like Fedora's Copr. The trust model of a flat namespace user repo is completely broken when the maintaining user can change at any moment.
Isn't Arch's AUR flat namespace quite unique? Ubuntu's PPAs are also not flat.
Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#47A side note, isn't package maintenance something that can actually be solved to some extent by LLMs? The prompt would be something like "Clone this repo and build this package while building/bundling as few other packages as possible with minimal code changes." Then set it in a loop on all the packages for a particular system, I don't have experience in package maintenance and would be curious what kind of issues wou…
Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#48> New user registration was stopped on June 11 and then re-enabled after the project added Anubis to try to foil the attacker's mass account registrations. That did not work This confuses me - why would a proof-of-work anti-scraping system like Anubis prevent registrations?
This is not much, but it could deter some low effort adversaries.
Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#49Despite that official Arch repos weren't affected in this attack, I would not recommend using Arch (or any rolling release distro) for anything that requires security. (Imagine if the xz backdoor targeted Arch...) An Arch maintainer that I personally know once admitted that he rarely review upstream changes when bumping package versions. He only does that when the build breaks. I can't blame him for what he did, sinc…
Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks
#50> New user registration was stopped on June 11 and then re-enabled after the project added Anubis to try to foil the attacker's mass account registrations. That did not work This confuses me - why would a proof-of-work anti-scraping system like Anubis prevent registrations?
Implementing a bot to do registration is not a "copy as curl " click away anymore, and creating millions of accounts maybe become computationally expensive. This is not much, but it could deter some low effort adversaries.