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AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

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Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#41
> New user registration was stopped on June 11 and then re-enabled after the project added Anubis to try to foil the attacker's mass account registrations. That did not work

This confuses me - why would a proof-of-work anti-scraping system like Anubis prevent registrations?

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#42

I'll note that OpenSuse also has Packman which a shitton of people enable (for codecs), has also 'one namespace only' an looser policies than the main distro. I do not think this something you can escape by switching distro.

Zypper at least has a notion of "vendor", so you can arrange things so that only the handful of packages you care about will actually come from Packman.

Ubuntu actually has first-party repositories with proprietary codecs.

Nixpkgs is a pretty comprehensive monorepo of packages with a more normal review process than the AUR, and it includes non-free software as well, plus the model with flakes for third-party stuff is that you trust individual publishers for their little repos rather than one giant grab bag repo of unreviewed content like the AUR.

RPMFusion for Fedora kinda has a similar profile, in that it's a shared repo for various things unsuitable for the main one, but it follows more or less normal Fedora packaging and review standards, doesn't it?

Supply chain attacks are possible everywhere and some distros have particular weaknesses, but the AUR really is pretty much uniquely bad here.

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#43

I'll note that OpenSuse also has Packman which a shitton of people enable (for codecs), has also 'one namespace only' an looser policies than the main distro. I do not think this something you can escape by switching distro.

Packman is more akin to rpmfusion, than AUR. OBS is the AUR equivalent for OpenSUSE.

"One namespace" is also technically true but doesn't work the same way with dnf or zypper as it does with pacman. dnf and zypper both make it easy to be explicit about the priorities of your repos and also to track which packages come from which repos and prevent that from changing. Plus openSUSE has a generously free public instance of the Open Build Service that you can easily use to host your own repos, and which hosts many individual repos you can add for specific purposes. When I ran openSUSE I always just ran my own repo there with only the extra packages I actually wanted, often just "forking" packages from repos hosted by well-known openSUSE developers so that I didn't have to manage updating the source packages myself but still didn't pull in the whole world from those repos and also didn't implicitly trust anything as loose as the AUR.

OBS is more like Ubuntu's Launchpad or Fedora's CO0R than the AUR. Random strangers can't take over the packages of others just because they go idle, and it's a bunch of separate repos, not one. Totally different trust model.

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#44
Well all of those attacks are just supply chain attacks, and it is basically exploiting people's trust. With LLMs, the speed and velocity of pumping out malice raised are now significantly faster.

It is so sad that every goodwill eventually got enshittified as well.

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#45
post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

AUR isn't just the testing repo of Arch; it's explicitly just an open spot where anybody can put up "here's a PKGBUILD for folks". I don't see how it's like either the Nix or Debian examples.

Well, Nix has NUR which is a direct equivalent but it's not nearly as broadly used and I assume "here's a PKGBUILD for folks" is already too permissive for you if you're asking. There's no maintainer vetting process in nixpkgs as far as I know, anyone can own a bunch of packages. There are quality standards and it's not "here's a bunch of nix code for folks" but it's the next possible thing in the line after that.

The NUR was sort of convenient before flakes were a thing, but now that there's a really common convention for sharing Nix code few use it. I bet most people who came across Nix in the last 4 years have never even heard of it.

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#46
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, the only reason this isn't happening in other distros is simply popularity. Namespacing is the solution, and as mentioned in the article some ditros do indeed have namespaced user repos, like Fedora's Copr. The trust model of a flat namespace user repo is completely broken when the maintaining user can change at any moment.

Isn't Arch's AUR flat namespace quite unique? Ubuntu's PPAs are also not flat.

openSUSE's OBS and Gentoo's overlays aren't a single shared repo either.

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#47
post #30

A side note, isn't package maintenance something that can actually be solved to some extent by LLMs? The prompt would be something like "Clone this repo and build this package while building/bundling as few other packages as possible with minimal code changes." Then set it in a loop on all the packages for a particular system, I don't have experience in package maintenance and would be curious what kind of issues wou…

Packaging for Linux distros is about review, following standards and conventions, authority, and responsibility. (And maybe also sometimes patching for compatibility.) LLMs can sometimes help with some of the mechanical parts, but the curation and trust stuff not so much.

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#48
post #41

> New user registration was stopped on June 11 and then re-enabled after the project added Anubis to try to foil the attacker's mass account registrations. That did not work This confuses me - why would a proof-of-work anti-scraping system like Anubis prevent registrations?

Implementing a bot to do registration is not a "copy as curl " click away anymore, and creating millions of accounts maybe become computationally expensive.

This is not much, but it could deter some low effort adversaries.

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#49

Despite that official Arch repos weren't affected in this attack, I would not recommend using Arch (or any rolling release distro) for anything that requires security. (Imagine if the xz backdoor targeted Arch...) An Arch maintainer that I personally know once admitted that he rarely review upstream changes when bumping package versions. He only does that when the build breaks. I can't blame him for what he did, sinc…

Alarming. The whole point of official repositories is they're trusted, since they are maintained by trusted people. If one can't trust maintainers to be responsible, then the official repositories are no different than the AUR.

Re: AURpocalypse now: a look at the recent AUR attacks

#50
post #41

> New user registration was stopped on June 11 and then re-enabled after the project added Anubis to try to foil the attacker's mass account registrations. That did not work This confuses me - why would a proof-of-work anti-scraping system like Anubis prevent registrations?

Implementing a bot to do registration is not a "copy as curl " click away anymore, and creating millions of accounts maybe become computationally expensive. This is not much, but it could deter some low effort adversaries.

I see that, but the adversary wasn’t a low effort one, and didn’t need millions of accounts.
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