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The newest Instagram “exploit” is the goofiest I've seen

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Re: The newest Instagram “exploit” is the goofiest I've seen

#41
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

recovery is always the weakest link in any authentication system

This is not wrong but what’s really missing is cost: Meta did this so they can avoid paying people to do it. Lots of companies follow that decay spiral: your bank could shut phishers down cold by requiring wire transfers to be authorized in person but they don’t want to pay staff or risk you being upset by a transaction taking an extra hour so they don’t. Imagine an alternate universe where big tech companies worked…

The amount of hassle involved with regular physical checks is why it's not implemented, regardless of attack prevention.

The cost of hiring a person is part of it but not really the core reason. People were sold on the Internet with "you can do things online conveniently" and reintroducing the need to physically go somewhere negates that angle entirely.

Re: The newest Instagram “exploit” is the goofiest I've seen

#42
post #21

It's insane the AI has been provided the tooling to send emails to arbitrary addresses like that. Like, getting it to send a 2FA code at a user's request is one thing. But it should only be able to "hit a button" to send a 2FA email to the address attached to the account, all run with hand-written code. It shouldn't have access to the 2FA code itself, or the message subject, or body, or the recipient address, etc. Wh…

> But it should only be able to "hit a button" to send a 2FA email to the address attached to the account, all run with hand-written code. Genuine question...why would that need to be hand-written? It makes absolute sense as a general statement and is kinda crazy that this wasn't a built-in limitation, but I'm not quite sure why the code for that bit must be hand-written (provided the code functionally does what you…

Maybe not hand-written, but definitely static, and at least human-reviewed/tested to only allow sending to previously-validated email addresses.

Re: The newest Instagram “exploit” is the goofiest I've seen

#43
post #21

It's insane the AI has been provided the tooling to send emails to arbitrary addresses like that. Like, getting it to send a 2FA code at a user's request is one thing. But it should only be able to "hit a button" to send a 2FA email to the address attached to the account, all run with hand-written code. It shouldn't have access to the 2FA code itself, or the message subject, or body, or the recipient address, etc. Wh…

This exploit has essentially nothing to do with AI and everything to do with a terribly designed account recovery flow.

This exact same flow could have been (and may have been; I don’t know how much the chatbot here actually does) statically coded.

Re: The newest Instagram “exploit” is the goofiest I've seen

#44

How is this "embarrassing" instead of subject to legal liability? We really need similar rules to other engineering disciplines. If your building falls with people inside, you killed them.

You said it, instagram is not life-critical

Re: The newest Instagram “exploit” is the goofiest I've seen

#45
So the AI agent had privileged access to remove 2FA, ignore the account email, and just hands accounts to whoever asked? Honestly that’s so highly negligent I wonder if the implementation team for that “feature” was intentionally trying to do as much subtle damage to meta as possible before their inventible layoff.

It’s a shame nobody tried to get it to drop the production table entirely! (mostly joking). Just claim to be a high level SRE solving some critical production bug, the only solution to which is dropping the database.

Re: The newest Instagram “exploit” is the goofiest I've seen

#46
post #21

It's insane the AI has been provided the tooling to send emails to arbitrary addresses like that. Like, getting it to send a 2FA code at a user's request is one thing. But it should only be able to "hit a button" to send a 2FA email to the address attached to the account, all run with hand-written code. It shouldn't have access to the 2FA code itself, or the message subject, or body, or the recipient address, etc. Wh…

> But it should only be able to "hit a button" to send a 2FA email to the address attached to the account, all run with hand-written code. Genuine question...why would that need to be hand-written? It makes absolute sense as a general statement and is kinda crazy that this wasn't a built-in limitation, but I'm not quite sure why the code for that bit must be hand-written (provided the code functionally does what you…

I think he likely means "code that is hand-reviewed" and not directly controlled by the agent. He's probably meaning to differentiate it against the in-process agent writing the code. It doesn't matter too much if that fixed code was written by an LLM under guidance and review of the SWE, outside the agent.

Re: The newest Instagram “exploit” is the goofiest I've seen

#48
post #9

Support requests have always been the weakest link in the security chain for big corps. I've had accounts of mine turned over with 2FA disabled by humans before. I guess we shouldn't be surprised that the LLMs are doing the same thing. The simple fact that 2FA can be removed by low level support staff drives me mad. It defeats the whole purpose of the process.

100%

Urgency.

Emotions.

It's all there, and high-stakes environments with no proper protocol are most vulnerable.

Source: used to work part-time in IT support at a hospital, by now 10+ years ago, so it was routinely requested to circumvent regulations and security protocols, even medical ones (cough Windows in ICU monitors and other medical "kiosk" PCs that should absolutely not run Windows)

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