This blog is one of the most confused and inaccurate collection of writing that I recurrently find on HN. The account spams a deeply flawed blog post about 'Category theory illustrated' (also referenced from this article) where it misstates central theorems in CT and this 'Case against boolean logic' article, which promises an alternative to Boolean logic, but never formulates one.
The article instead gestures toward a heavily conflated 4 epistemic 'categories' (True, False, Unknown / unknowable, Meaningless / senseless) that conflate semantic truth values, epistemic states, and linguistic well-formedness.
You can represent all of these distinctions inside ordinary first-order logic. You can have:
Meaningless(fact)= True/False
Unknown(fact) = True/False ...and so on and so forth.
Where's the escape from boolean logic now? If anything, it points you to the fact that boolean logic is much more flexible than the given categories, which box you, from infinite possibilities into a few. Ironically, this could be abused even better by authority. An institution could simply say 'Human rights is a meaningless question, in the context of progress and prosperity. Asking us if we're for or against it is binary thinking.'
The biggest blind spot however is the idea that a proof is a universal tool for getting to truth. This completely dismisses the central thesis in philosophy and science of analytic-synthetic distinction. Intuitionistic proof theory works for analytic claims (like math) because their truth is self-contained. But synthetic claims (clamis about how the real world actually is) cannot be proven with mathematical certainty, but only supported, challenged or revised via empirical observation.
By trying to map formal proof theory directly onto politics and psychology, the author ignores how empirical truth actually works, e.g. gravity isn't proven like a theorem. as Popper noted, scientific theories are falsifiable and subject to revision, shifting from Newtonian to relativistic contexts while reality stays the same.