Earlier quoted context omitted.
Has there been a single publicly known attack that would have been prevented by this?
Several actually. Pypi is regularly targeted in this way.
Debian must ship reproducible packages
41–50 of 178 posts
Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#42Earlier quoted context omitted.
It does not solve all supply chain issues, it do solve some supply chain issues. Not being able to see if the source code shipped is the same as been used for creating the binary is scary
Has there been a single publicly known attack that would have been prevented by this?
Less diligent projects had it but there are easier ways to fix it
Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
There was no bug or attack on Debian since 2007 that reproducible packages would prevent. "Well worth it" is not correct. And it just ups the the contribution barrier to Debian higher, I already heard a lot of people complaining that contributing to Debian is hard and while in past I defended it by "they need all the checks and bounds to make sure packages play with eachother nicely", this is just step that makes it…
There was perhaps no detected bug or attack. There have most likely been bugs or attacks that reproducible builds would have prevented.
If anything it will make attacker's job easier, as Ubuntu package will have same files structured exactly same way as Debian one.
Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#44Good thing. NetBSD has fully reproductible build since 2017. https://blog.netbsd.org/tnf/entry/netbsd_fully_reproducible_...
While we are bragging, stagex was the first to hit 100% full source bootstrapped deterministic and hermetic builds last year and the first to make multiple signed reproductions by different maintainers on their own hardware mandatory for every release. Debian has come along way, but when Debian says reproducible they mean they grab third party binaries to build theirs. When we say reproducible we mean 100% bootstrapp…
Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#45Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#46Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#47Has anyone fought Microsoft Visual Studio successfully to produce reproducible builds of C++ programs? From what I have heard, it is one of the worst contexts to do it.
Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#48Earlier quoted context omitted.
Has there been a single publicly known attack that would have been prevented by this?
Several actually. Pypi is regularly targeted in this way.
Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#49This is a huge achievement for Debian and the free software world. It took a while though until this was understood. In 2007 when pointing out on debian-devel that this is needed, I was still told what huge waste of time this would be. And indeed it took a huge amount of work by many people to get there, but it is well worth it.
There was no bug or attack on Debian since 2007 that reproducible packages would prevent. "Well worth it" is not correct. And it just ups the the contribution barrier to Debian higher, I already heard a lot of people complaining that contributing to Debian is hard and while in past I defended it by "they need all the checks and bounds to make sure packages play with eachother nicely", this is just step that makes it…
https://reproducible-builds.org/
Could you perhaps respond to the argumentation here?
Re: Debian must ship reproducible packages
#50This is a huge achievement for Debian and the free software world. It took a while though until this was understood. In 2007 when pointing out on debian-devel that this is needed, I was still told what huge waste of time this would be. And indeed it took a huge amount of work by many people to get there, but it is well worth it.
There was no bug or attack on Debian since 2007 that reproducible packages would prevent. "Well worth it" is not correct. And it just ups the the contribution barrier to Debian higher, I already heard a lot of people complaining that contributing to Debian is hard and while in past I defended it by "they need all the checks and bounds to make sure packages play with eachother nicely", this is just step that makes it…
Have many organizations produce the binaries independently and post the arifacts.
Once n of m parties agree on the arifact hash, take that as the trusted build.
If every party reaches a different hash then we cannot build consensus.