41–50 of 89 posts
Finally encrypted client hello support \o/
Is this something that we can enable "today" or is it going to take 12 years for browsers and servers to support?
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That’s usually done not on the network side but through the device itself. Think MDM and endpoint management.
A good solution is tackling it on both. At work we have network level firewalls with separate policies for internal and guest networks, and our managed PCs sync a filter policy as well (through primarily for when those devices are not on our network). The network level is more efficient, easier to manage and troubleshoot, and works on appliances, rogue hardware, and other things that happen not to have client managem…
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A good solution is tackling it on both. At work we have network level firewalls with separate policies for internal and guest networks, and our managed PCs sync a filter policy as well (through primarily for when those devices are not on our network). The network level is more efficient, easier to manage and troubleshoot, and works on appliances, rogue hardware, and other things that happen not to have client managem…
Well, if you have MDM you should be able to just disable ECH.
I just updated to 3.5x to get pq support. Anything that might tempt me to upgrade to 4.0?
The top feature, “ Support for Encrypted Client Hello (ECH, RFC 9849)”, is of prime importance to those operating Internet-accessible servers, or clients; hopefully your Postgres server is not one such!
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Nginx mainline 1.29.x supports it. So once you get that and also the openssl version on your system, good to go. Likely too late for ubuntu 26.04, maybe in debian 14 next year, or of course rolling release distros / containers. But, in a personal/single website server, ech does not really add privacy, adversaries can still observe the IP metadata and compare what's hosted there. The real benefits are on huge cloud ho…
FWIW Nginx 1.30 [1] just released and supports it so most distributions will have support as soon as those responsible for builds and testing builds push it forward. "Nginx 1.30 incorporates all of the changes from the Nginx 1.29.x mainline branch to provide a lot of new functionality like Multipath TCP (MPTCP)." "Nginx 1.30 also adds HTTP/2 to backend and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH), sticky sessions support for ups…
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Once upon a time, "reasonable networks" blocked ICMP, too. They were wrong then, of course, and they're still wrong now.
Once upon a time, like today? ICMP is most definitely only allowed situationally through firewalls today.
Because I can ping almost any public server on the internet and they will reply. I can ping your website just fine and it replies to me!
How is OpenSSl these days? I vaguely remember the big ruckus a while back, was it Heartbleed? where everyone to their horror realized it was maybe 1 or 2 people trying to maintain OpenSSL, and the OpenBSD people then throwing manpower at it to clear up a lot of old outstanding bugs. It seems like it is on firmer/more organized footing these days?
It’s still terrible. There was a brief period immediately after Heartbleed that it was rapidly improving but the entire OpenSSL 3 was a huge disappointment to anyone who cared about performance and complexity and developer experience (ergonomics). Core operations in OpenSSL 3 are still much much slower than in OpenSSL 1.1.1. The HAProxy people wrote a very good blog post on the state of SSL stacks: https://www.haprox…
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The security side of OpenSSL improved significantly since Heartbleed, which was a galvanizing moment for the maintenance practices of the project. It doesn't hurt that OpenSSL is now one of the most actively researched software security targets on the Internet. The software quality side of OpenSSL paradoxically probably regressed since Heartbleed: there's a rough consensus that the design of OpenSSL 3.0 was a major s…
On this topic, there was a great episode of a little-known podcast about Python cryptography and OpenSSL that was really eye opening: https://securitycryptographywhatever.buzzsprout.com/1822302/... :)
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FWIW Nginx 1.30 [1] just released and supports it so most distributions will have support as soon as those responsible for builds and testing builds push it forward. "Nginx 1.30 incorporates all of the changes from the Nginx 1.29.x mainline branch to provide a lot of new functionality like Multipath TCP (MPTCP)." "Nginx 1.30 also adds HTTP/2 to backend and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH), sticky sessions support for ups…
It's not that adversaries can directly see the domain name; this doesn't have anything to do with domain fronting. The issue is that ECH doesn't hide the server's IP address, so it's mostly useless for privacy if that IP address uniquely identifies that server. The situation where it helps is if the server shares that IP address with lots of other people, i.e., if it's behind a big cloud CDN that supports ECH (AFAIK…
If I had a long running site I could do the same thing by having multiple font-end caching nodes using HAProxy or NGinx that come and go but I acknowledge others may not have the time to do that and most probably would not.
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> In short, OSSL_PARAM works by passing arrays of key-value pairs to functions, instead of normal argument passing. Ah yes, the ole' " fn(args: Map )" approach. Highly auditable, and Very Safe.
I think one of the main motivators was supporting the new module framework that replaced engines. The FIPS module specifically is OpenSSL's gravy train, and at the time the FIPS certification and compliance mandate effectively required the ability to maintain ABI compatibility of a compiled FIPS module across multiple major OpenSSL releases, so end users could easily upgrade OpenSSL for bug fixes and otherwise stay c…
I really wish Linux Foundation or some other big OSS founded complete replacement of it, then just write a shim that translates ABI calls from this to openssl 1.1 lookalike