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Open source security at Astral

astral.sh

41–50 of 120 posts

Re: Open source security at Astral

#41
post #28

The only binaries of uv in the world you can get that were full source bootstrapped from signed package commits to signed reviews to multi-signed deterministic artifacts are the ones from my teammates and I at stagex. All keys on geodistributed smartcards held by maintainers tied to a web of trust going back 25 years with over 5000 keys. https://stagex.tools/packages/core/uv/ Though thankful for clients that let indi…

What are you using for signed reviews?

Re: Open source security at Astral

#42
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Why is it a bunch of mostly unpaid volunteer hackers are putting more effort into supply chain security than OpenAI. Unpaid volunteer hackers provide their work for free under licenses designed for the purpose of allowing companies like OpenAI to use their work without paying or contributing in any form. OpenAI wants to make the most money. Why would they spend any time or money on something they can get for free?

Yep. Permissive licenses, "open source", it's all just free work for the worst corporations you can think.

It's free work for anyone.

Re: Open source security at Astral

#43
post #41
post #28

The only binaries of uv in the world you can get that were full source bootstrapped from signed package commits to signed reviews to multi-signed deterministic artifacts are the ones from my teammates and I at stagex. All keys on geodistributed smartcards held by maintainers tied to a web of trust going back 25 years with over 5000 keys. https://stagex.tools/packages/core/uv/ Though thankful for clients that let indi…

What are you using for signed reviews?

I promise we are actively working on a much better solution we hope any distro can use, but... for now we just enforce signed merge commits by a different maintainer other than the author as something they only do for code they personally reviewed.

Re: Open source security at Astral

#44
post #28

The only binaries of uv in the world you can get that were full source bootstrapped from signed package commits to signed reviews to multi-signed deterministic artifacts are the ones from my teammates and I at stagex. All keys on geodistributed smartcards held by maintainers tied to a web of trust going back 25 years with over 5000 keys. https://stagex.tools/packages/core/uv/ Though thankful for clients that let indi…

> Why is it a bunch of mostly unpaid volunteer hackers are putting more effort into supply chain security than OpenAI.

Didn't the acquisition only happen a few weeks ago? Wouldn't it be more alarming if OpenAI had gone in and forced them to change their build process? Unless you're claiming that the article is lying about this being a description of what they've already been doing for a while (which seems a bit outlandish without more evidence), it's not clear to me why you're attributing this process to the parent company.

Don't get me wrong; there's plenty you can criticize OpenAI over, and I'm not taking a stance on your technical claims, but it seems somewhat disingenuous to phrase it like this.

Re: Open source security at Astral

#45
post #36
post #32

The entire paragraph about version pinning using hashes (and using a map lookup for in-workflow binary deps) reminds me that software engineers are forever doomed to reinvent worse versions of nixpkgs and flakes. I don't even love Nix, it's full of pitfalls and weirdnesses, but it provides so much by-default immutability and reproducibility that I sometimes forget how others need to rediscover this stuff from first p…

>worse versions of nixpkgs and flakes You mean statically-compiled binaries and hash pinning? Those have been around a bit longer than Nix :-)

Were they deployed at scale in such a way that most (open and some non-free) software is packaged as such? I've never seen this happen until nixpkgs.

Re: Open source security at Astral

#46
post #28

The only binaries of uv in the world you can get that were full source bootstrapped from signed package commits to signed reviews to multi-signed deterministic artifacts are the ones from my teammates and I at stagex. All keys on geodistributed smartcards held by maintainers tied to a web of trust going back 25 years with over 5000 keys. https://stagex.tools/packages/core/uv/ Though thankful for clients that let indi…

The private jet wont fuel itself now will it.

Re: Open source security at Astral

#47
Pinning github actions by commit SHA does not solve the supply chain problem if the pinned action itself is pulling in other dependencies which themselves could be compromised. An action can pull in a docker image as a dependency for example. It is effectively security theatre. The real fix is owning the code that runs in your CI pipelines. Or fork the action itself and maintain it as part of your infrastructure.

Re: Open source security at Astral

#48

Pinning github actions by commit SHA does not solve the supply chain problem if the pinned action itself is pulling in other dependencies which themselves could be compromised. An action can pull in a docker image as a dependency for example. It is effectively security theatre. The real fix is owning the code that runs in your CI pipelines. Or fork the action itself and maintain it as part of your infrastructure.

Shouldn't you always read & double-check the 3rd-party GitHub actions you use, anyway? (Forking or copying their code alone doesn't solve the issue you mention any more than pinning a SHA does.)

Re: Open source security at Astral

#50
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Why is it a bunch of mostly unpaid volunteer hackers are putting more effort into supply chain security than OpenAI. Unpaid volunteer hackers provide their work for free under licenses designed for the purpose of allowing companies like OpenAI to use their work without paying or contributing in any form. OpenAI wants to make the most money. Why would they spend any time or money on something they can get for free?

Yep. Permissive licenses, "open source", it's all just free work for the worst corporations you can think.

Never let the left hand know what the right hand is doing. I suppose it works both ways here, but the specific end user is not why people make code available, it’s in the hope of improving things, even just the tiniest bit.
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