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It refused to generate the email saying it sounds unethical, but after I copy-pasted the intro to the challenge from the website, it complied directly.
I also wonder if the Gmail spam filter isn't intercepting the vast majority of those emails...
$100 for a massive trove of prompt injection examples is a pretty damn good deal lol
OpenClaw user here. Genuinely curious to see if this works and how easy it turns out to be in practice. One thing I'd love to hear opinions on: are there significant security differences between models like Opus and Sonnet when it comes to prompt injection resistance? Any experiences?
> One thing I'd love to hear opinions on: are there significant security differences between models like Opus and Sonnet when it comes to prompt injection resistance? Is this a worthwhile question when it’s a fundamental security issue with LLMs? In meatspace, we fire Alice and Bob if they fail too many phishing training emails, because they’ve proven they’re a liability. You can’t fire an LLM.
But we don't stop using locks just because all locks can be picked. We still pick the better lock. Same here, especially when your agent has shell access and a wallet.
First: If Fiu is a standard OpenClaw assistant then it should retain context between emails, right? So it will know it's being hit with nonstop prompt injection attempts and will become paranoid. If so, that isn't a realistic model of real prompt injection attacks.
Second: What exactly is Fiu instructed to do with these emails? It doesn't follow arbitrary instructions from the emails, does it? If it did, then it ought to be easy to break it, e.g. by uploading a malicious package to PyPI and telling the agent to run `uvx my-useful-package`, but that also wouldn't be realistic. I assume it's not doing that and is instead told to just… what, read the emails? Act as someone's assistant? What specific actions is it supposed to be taking with the emails? (Maybe I would understand this if I actually had familiarity with OpenClaw.)
I don‘t understand. The website states: „He‘s not allowed to reply without human approval“. The faq states: „ How do I know if my injection worked? Fiu responds to your email. If it worked, you'll see secrets.env contents in the response: API keys, tokens, etc. If not, you get a normal (probably confused) reply. Keep trying. “
Yes, Fiu has permission to send emails, but he’s instructed not to send anything without explicit confirmation from his owner.
Two issues. First: If Fiu is a standard OpenClaw assistant then it should retain context between emails, right? So it will know it's being hit with nonstop prompt injection attempts and will become paranoid. If so, that isn't a realistic model of real prompt injection attacks. Second: What exactly is Fiu instructed to do with these emails? It doesn't follow arbitrary instructions from the emails, does it? If it did,…
This doesn't mean you could still hack it!
Sneaky way of gathering a mailing list of AI people