41–50 of 136 posts
The blog author seems like a real piece of work. He ghosts the WolfSSL maintainer for over 160 days and when asked to open a new, more specific issue, he instead chooses to write a blog post denigrating the project. The WolfSSL maintainer was nothing but courteous and helpful throughout the entire exchange. >...they aren't really interested in RFC compliance. Yeah, well "feld" can't claim to be "interested in RFC com…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Rustls still outsources cryptographic primitives. I believe the currently supported providers of those are… drumroll… AWS-LC and Ring. The latter is a fork of BoringSSL. The article describes AWS-LC and BoringSSL as "Googled and Amazoned to death; they don't care about anyone but their own use cases". The state of things sucks :-(
there is https://github.com/RustCrypto/rustls-rustcrypto fwiw
> USE THIS AT YOUR OWN RISK! DO NOT USE THIS IN PRODUCTION
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Again: the maintainer does not say there is no bug. He says: please open a new issue, with a proper title and description for the actual underlying problem. Is that seriously too much to ask? Instead, the guy writes a whole blog post shitting on the project. Does anyone still wonder why people burn out on maintaining FOSS projects?
Not great behavior I agree, but what else is there to say other than "it does not match the spec at point 1.2.3"?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
rustls is there. It has TLS in the name, it is good and there is a C FFI wrapper.
Rustls still outsources cryptographic primitives. I believe the currently supported providers of those are… drumroll… AWS-LC and Ring. The latter is a fork of BoringSSL. The article describes AWS-LC and BoringSSL as "Googled and Amazoned to death; they don't care about anyone but their own use cases". The state of things sucks :-(
NanoSSL by DigiCert https://dev.digicert.com/trustcore-sdk/nanossl.html It's opensource -> https://github.com/digicert/trustcore
This is the WolfSSL maintainer's response[1] > This ticket is rather long and has a lot of irrelevant content regarding this new topic. If I need to bring in a colleague I do not want them to have to wade through all the irrelevant context. If you would like, please open a new issue with regards to how we support middlebox compatibility. The author turns this into: > The GitHub issue comment left at the end leads me…
The maintainer should just open a new issue for RFC compliance himself since that's a pretty big issue and he obviously thinks OP spams too much. This game of stalling / obfuscating via the issue tracker gets very old.
This is the WolfSSL maintainer's response[1] > This ticket is rather long and has a lot of irrelevant content regarding this new topic. If I need to bring in a colleague I do not want them to have to wade through all the irrelevant context. If you would like, please open a new issue with regards to how we support middlebox compatibility. The author turns this into: > The GitHub issue comment left at the end leads me…
The maintainer should just open a new issue for RFC compliance himself since that's a pretty big issue and he obviously thinks OP spams too much. This game of stalling / obfuscating via the issue tracker gets very old.
If the maintainer just opens the concise bug report they want (RFC .... Section ... If TLS1.3 is negotiated and client sends session id, server must send cipherchangespec), they have what they want and can move on with their life.
However, if the maintainer can get the reporter to do it, the reporter has become a better reporter and the world has become a better place.
IMHO, the original bug report was pretty out there. Asking a library developer to debug a client they don't use with a sever they didn't write either is pretty demanding. I know openssl has a minimal server, I expect woflssl does too? that would be easier to debug.
Actually, on re-reading the original report, the reporter links to a discussion where they have all the RFC references. Had the reporter summarized that to begin with, rather than suggesting a whole lot of other stuff (like a different wolfssl issue that has to be completely unrelated), I think the issue would have gone better.
I will further add that putting a MUST in an appendix seems kind of poor editing. It should have been noted in section 4.1.2 and/or 4.1.3 that a non-empty legacy_session_id indicates that the server MUST send a cipher change spec. It's not totally obvious, but if the client requests middlebox compatability, the RFC says the server MUST do it. If the client doesn't request it by sending a legacy session id, the server can still send a superfluous change cipher spec message if it wants, although I don't know if it will help without the session id.
The blog author seems like a real piece of work. He ghosts the WolfSSL maintainer for over 160 days and when asked to open a new, more specific issue, he instead chooses to write a blog post denigrating the project. The WolfSSL maintainer was nothing but courteous and helpful throughout the entire exchange. >...they aren't really interested in RFC compliance. Yeah, well "feld" can't claim to be "interested in RFC com…
I don't think it's fair to judge the whole FreeBSD community by one person.