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Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

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41–50 of 54 posts

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#41
This campaign worked because the operator knew exactly what most detection stacks look for: execution, lateral movement, data exfil. They did none of that. They dropped a loader, confirmed it worked, and left. No behavioral triggers, no alerts, nothing for a SOC analyst to chase.

That's the gap with point-in-time security and checkbox compliance. You run your scan, get a clean report, move on. Meanwhile something like this sits in memory waiting for a buyer. The checklist says "run vulnerability scans quarterly" not "detect dormant in-memory class loaders planted by initial access brokers." Continuous monitoring that baselines normal behavior and flags deviations, even subtle ones like a new JSP file in a path that shouldn't change, is the only way to catch this. But most orgs aren't doing it because their compliance framework doesn't require it.

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The thing is that real security isn't something that a checklist can guarantee. You have to build it into the product architecture and mindset of every engineer that works on the project. At every single stage, you have to be thinking "How do I minimize this attack surface? What inputs might come in that I don't expect? What are the ways that this code might be exploited that I haven't thought about? What privileges…

> but now there's a very strong incentive to not report data breaches and have your insurance premiums go up or government regulation come down I would argue the opposite is true. Insurance doesn’t pay out if you don’t self-report in time. Big data breaches usually get discovered when the hacker tries to peddle off the data in a darknet marketplace so not reporting is gambling that this won’t happen.

Curious how the compromised company can report if the compromise has not been detected

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#43
post #2

Every single Ivanti product (including their SSL-VPN) should be considered a critical threat. The fact that this company is allowed to continue to sell their malware dressed-up as "security solutions" is a disaster. How they haven't been sued into bankruptcy is something I'll never understand.

The purpose of cybersecurity products and companies is not to sell security . It's to sell the illusion of security to (often incompetent) execs - which is perfectly fine because the market doesn't actually punish security breaches so an illusion is all that's needed. It is an insanely lucrative industry selling luxury-grade snake oil. Actual cybersecurity isn't something you can just buy off-the-shelf and requires s…

I think, to add to the comment, the whole raison d'être of zero days is that an (exploitable) bug has been found that the producer of the software is not aware of/has not produced a patch for.

It's fine to say "Look this is bad, don't do" and "A patch was issued for this, you are responsible" but when some set of circumstances arises that has not been thought about before that cause a problem, then there's nothing that could have been done to stop it.

Note that the entire QA industry is explicitly geared to try and look at software being produced in a way that nobody else has thought to, in order to find if that software still behaves "correctly", and hackers are an extension of that - people looking at software in a way that developers and QA did not think of.. etc

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#44

Why the fuck do people still use Ivanti, and while we're at it, Cisco gear? How many backdoors and vulnerabilities can these two companies produce until they get put out of business? If you ask me... both these companies should be treated similarly to misbehaving banks: banned from acquiring new customers, an external overseer installed, and only when the products do not pose a threat to the general public any more,…

Ivanti is a necrotic acquirer of things. Kind of like a poor version of Microfocus or Broadcom pre-VMware and pre-AI hype. (Broadcom even bought CA, which was the ultimate company of this type.)

This product was MobileIron, which was actually a pretty decent MDM platform, except like most acquisitions like this I'm sure they purged anyone with a clue. Unlike something like Pulse VPN, MDM is a sticky product and difficult/time-consuming to transition from.

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#45

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The purpose of cybersecurity products and companies is not to sell security . It's to sell the illusion of security to (often incompetent) execs - which is perfectly fine because the market doesn't actually punish security breaches so an illusion is all that's needed. It is an insanely lucrative industry selling luxury-grade snake oil. Actual cybersecurity isn't something you can just buy off-the-shelf and requires s…

I think, to add to the comment, the whole raison d'être of zero days is that an (exploitable) bug has been found that the producer of the software is not aware of/has not produced a patch for. It's fine to say "Look this is bad, don't do" and "A patch was issued for this, you are responsible" but when some set of circumstances arises that has not been thought about before that cause a problem, then there's nothing th…

Defense in depth and multiple layers of security should ideally protect against zero-days; see the Swiss cheese model of accidents for an example; most aviation accidents are rarely caused by a single factor but an improbable combination of factors.

This is why I also think “zero trust” and internet-accessible SaaS has done so much damage to the industry. Before, if your version control server has a vuln, the attackers still need to get on your VPN to even be able to scan for that vuln. Now, your version control server is on the internet and/or is an SaaS and all it takes is an exploit or a set of phished credentials for anyone anywhere in the world to get in.

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think, to add to the comment, the whole raison d'être of zero days is that an (exploitable) bug has been found that the producer of the software is not aware of/has not produced a patch for. It's fine to say "Look this is bad, don't do" and "A patch was issued for this, you are responsible" but when some set of circumstances arises that has not been thought about before that cause a problem, then there's nothing th…

Defense in depth and multiple layers of security should ideally protect against zero-days; see the Swiss cheese model of accidents for an example; most aviation accidents are rarely caused by a single factor but an improbable combination of factors. This is why I also think “zero trust” and internet-accessible SaaS has done so much damage to the industry. Before, if your version control server has a vuln, the attacke…

> Defense in depth and multiple layers of security should ideally protect against zero-days

Absolutely agree, and that's why instant security in a can (just add water!) cannot work (as you have been saying)

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#47

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Holy those checklists are the bane of my existence. For example demanding 2FA for email, which is impossible if you self host, unless you force everyone to use RoundCube, but then you have to answer to the CEO why he can’t get email on his iPhone in the mail app. Or just loads of other stuff that really only applies to large Fortune 500 size companies. My small startups certainly don’t have a network engineer on staf…

I'm mostly with you (see my other comment) but MFA on email really is table stakes and your CEO will be the first to be phished without it.

I like to implement independent mail systems. No SSO BS. IT enters the password into the mail client while setting up the laptop and phone. The boss can't be phished if he doesn't know his password (or if the password has no use on the internet).

I also like to put everything behind a VPN (again no SSO). But the bigger the company gets, sooner or later this will come to an end. Because it's not "best practice" to not be phishable. Apparently what is needed are layers and layers of BS "security" products that can be tricked by a kid that has heard of JS. https://browser.security

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#48
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The thing is that real security isn't something that a checklist can guarantee. You have to build it into the product architecture and mindset of every engineer that works on the project. At every single stage, you have to be thinking "How do I minimize this attack surface? What inputs might come in that I don't expect? What are the ways that this code might be exploited that I haven't thought about? What privileges…

You’re making many assumptions which fit your worldview. I can assure you that insurers don’t work like that. If underwriting was as sloppy as you think it is insurance as a business model wouldn’t work.

The financial sector is famously sloppy and it’s still doing just fine.

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Actually there is a significant push to more effective products coming from the reinsurance companies that underwrite cyber risks. Most of them come with a checklist of things you need to have before they sign you at any reasonable price. The more we get government regulation for fines in cases of breaches etc. the more this trend will accelerate.

Holy those checklists are the bane of my existence. For example demanding 2FA for email, which is impossible if you self host, unless you force everyone to use RoundCube, but then you have to answer to the CEO why he can’t get email on his iPhone in the mail app. Or just loads of other stuff that really only applies to large Fortune 500 size companies. My small startups certainly don’t have a network engineer on staf…

And... this is why the hyperscale cloud is such a compelling choice, even though it costs 10x what running your own servers would cost.

Adding the security feature(s) you need is just a +$100/m checkbox, and they generally have sane defaults or templates that will position you better than some 3rd party vendor with confusing documentation and infrequent updates that require downtime windows to apply.

Re: Sleeper Shells: Attackers Are Planting Dormant Backdoors in Ivanti EPMM

#50
post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The thing is that real security isn't something that a checklist can guarantee. You have to build it into the product architecture and mindset of every engineer that works on the project. At every single stage, you have to be thinking "How do I minimize this attack surface? What inputs might come in that I don't expect? What are the ways that this code might be exploited that I haven't thought about? What privileges…

You are asserting that security has to be hand-crafted. That is a very strong claim, if you think about it. Is it not possible to have secure software components that only work when assembled in secure ways? Why not? Conversely, what security claims about a component can one rely upon, without verifying it oneself? How would a non-professional verify claims of security professionals, who have a strong interest in peo…

Corporate security is beyond merely making sure software itself is secure.

Phishing for example requires no security vulnerabilities, and is one of the primary initial attack vectors into a company.

You need proper training and the right incentives for people to actually care and think before they act.

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