Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
41–50 of 155 posts
Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#42> Network Boundary Shield
> The Network Boundary Shield (NBS) is a protection against attacks from an external network (the Internet) to an internal network - especially against a reconnaissance attack where a web browser is abused as a proxy.
> The main goal of NBS is to prevent attacks where a public website requests a resource from the internal network (e.g. the logo of the manufacturer of the local router); NBS will detect that a web page hosted on the public Internet is trying to connect to a local IP address. NBS only blocks HTTP requests from a web page hosted on a public IP address to a private network resource; the user can allow specific web pages to access local resources (e.g. when using Intranet services).
Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#43> Hey - have some bad news.
> We accidentally committed your email to our repo as part of a script that was activating OpenCode Black.
> No other information was included, just the email on its own.
Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#44They keep adding features without maintaining the core. I stopped using it when they started selling plans. The main reason for Opencode was to use multiple models but it turns out context sharing across models is PIA and impractical right now. I went back to using Claude Code and Codex side by side. Having said that, there is definitely a need for open platform to utilize multiple vendors and models. I just don’t th…
Amp can do small utility scripts and changes for free (especially if you enable the ads) and Crush+GLM is pretty good at following plans done by Claude or Codex
Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#45Isn't it insane that any web page can run a port scan in the first place? Who wants that? Meanwhile, running opencode in a podman container seems to stop this particular, err, feature.
Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#46Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#47This is pretty egregious. And outside the fact the server is now disabled by default, once it's running it is still egregious: > When server is enabled, any web page served from localhost/127.0.0.1 can execute code > When server is enabled, any local process can execute code without authentication > No indication when server is running (users may be unaware of exposure) I'm sorry this is horrible. I really want there…
Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#48Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#49Re: Unauthenticated remote code execution in OpenCode
#50hey maintainer here we've done a poor job handling these security reports, usage has grown rapidly and we're overwhelmed with issues we're meeting with some people this week to advise us on how to handle this better, get a bug bounty program funded and have some audits done