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Earlier quoted context omitted.
It wouldn't work at all as open source since you could just modify the source to sign your AI generated pictures.
it would. it would just require pki and a secure enclave that lives directly on the imaging chip to support it.
> What are the camera's specs?
> The camera has a 16MP resolution, 4656 x 3496 pixels. It uses a Sony IMX519 CMOS sensor.
What concerns me most in the era of gen AI irt photography is journalism. We need truth, most especially when limited-means citizen journalism is the only reliable source of that truth. But I feel like the only way to accomplish fool-proof photos we can trust in a trustless way (i.e. without relying on e.g. the Press Association to vet) is to utterly PACK the hardware with sensors and tamper-proof attestation so the…
The only real solution I can think of is just to have multiple independent parties photograph the same event and use social trust. Luckily this solution is getting easier now that almost everyone is generally no further than 3 feet away from multiple cameras.
I wonder how this compares to similar initiatives by e.g. Sony [0] and Leica [1]. [0]: https://authenticity.sony.net/camera/en-us/ [1]: https://petapixel.com/2023/10/26/leica-m11-p-review-as-authe...
* https://petapixel.com/2010/12/01/russian-software-firm-break...
* https://www.elcomsoft.com/presentations/Forging_Canon_Origin...
This is rather expensive for what looks like a home 3D printed toy with some cute software. Other than that it's a 16MP Sony CMOS, I'd expect a pretty noisy picture... How do I get my photos off the camera? Coming soon. We're working on export functionality to get your photos off the camera. It would be more interesting if the software was open source.
This attitude really rubs me the wrong way, especially on a site called Hacker News.
I think we absolutely should be supporting projects like this (if you think they're worth supporting), else all we're left with is giant corporation monoculture. Hardware startups are incredibly difficult, and by their nature new hardware products from small companies will always cost more than products produced by huge companies that have economies of scale and can afford billions of losses on new products.
So yes, I'm all for people taking risks with new hardware, and even if it doesn't have the most polished design, if it's doing something new and interesting I think it's kinda shitty to just dismiss it as looking like "a 3D printed toy with some cute software".
I wonder how this compares to similar initiatives by e.g. Sony [0] and Leica [1]. [0]: https://authenticity.sony.net/camera/en-us/ [1]: https://petapixel.com/2023/10/26/leica-m11-p-review-as-authe...
I knew that Leica is generally expensive, but the model on the review is insanely expensive (over 10K USD?). It is not even comparable.
https://spec.c2pa.org/specifications/specifications/2.2/inde...
What concerns me most in the era of gen AI irt photography is journalism. We need truth, most especially when limited-means citizen journalism is the only reliable source of that truth. But I feel like the only way to accomplish fool-proof photos we can trust in a trustless way (i.e. without relying on e.g. the Press Association to vet) is to utterly PACK the hardware with sensors and tamper-proof attestation so the…
Before long, it might be somewhat "easy" to prove anything.
Seems to me that a camera like this is necessarily, at least in part, a closed system that blocks you from controlling the software or hardware on the device you supposedly own. It's hard for me to think this is a good direction. And as others have pointed out, it can't prevent attacks through the analog hole, e.g. photographing a display. It's not feasible or desirable for our hardware devices to verify the informat…
Attestation systems are not inherently in conflict with repurposeability. If they let you install user firmware, then it simply won’t produce attestations linked to their signed builds, assuming you retain any of that functionality at all. If you want attestations to their key instead of yours, you just reinstall their signed OS, the HSM boot attests to whoever’s OS signature it finds using its unique hardware key, and everything works fine (even in a dual boot scenario).
What this does do is prevent you from altering their integrity-attested operating system to misrepresent that photos were taken by their operating system. You can, technically, mod it all you want — you just won’t have their signature on the attestation, because you had to sign it with some sort of key to boot it, and certainly that won’t be theirs.
They could even release their source code under BSD, GPL, or AGPL and it would make no difference to any of this; no open source license compels producing the crypto private keys you signed your build with, and any such argument for that applying to a license would be radioactive for it. Can you imagine trying to explain to your Legal team that you can’t extract a private key from an HSM to comply with the license? So it’s never going to happen: open source is about releasing code, not about letting you pass off your own work as someone else’s.
> must be based on reputation
But it is already. By example:
Is this vendor trusted in a court of law? Probably, I would imagine, it would stand up to the court’s inspection; given their motivations they no doubt have an excellent paper trail.
Are your personal attestations, those generated by your modded camera, trusted by a court of law? Well, that’s an interesting question: Did you create a fully reproducible build pipeline so that the court can inspect your customizations and decide whether to trust them? Did you keep record of your changes and the signatures of your build? Are you willing to provide your source code and build process to the court?
So, your desire for reputation is already satisfied, assuming that they allow OS modding. If they do not, that’s a voluntary-business decision, not a mandatory-technical one! There is nothing justifiable by cryptography or reputation in any theoretical plans that lock users out of repurposing their device.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
What proof is there that the photo scanner is scanning a genuine photo and not something AI generated that looks like a Polaroid?
Recalling an old scandal about an office copier/scanner which was doing some OCR cleanup and changing numbers.
Interestingly it wasn't the OCR that was the problem but the JBIG2 compression.
It seems like one could just shoot film and make darkroom prints and accomplish the same thing?