Earlier quoted context omitted.
This has no connection with reality. This is not an attestation mechanism, and can't be used as one.
Yes it absolutely is and will be used as such, this is EXACTLY how google play remote attestation works and a necessary building block for doing it in the browser. It is the exact reason why microsoft and google are pushing for tpms in windows 11 and it's already a reality on android and every grapheneos user knows the pain[0] and is the absolutely logical next step. [0] https://grapheneos.org/articles/attestation-co…
Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
41–50 of 71 posts
Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#42If TPM is used then the regular session cookies are also secure, just in a different way. One can use hardware based attestation to tie the session token/cookie to the device and so they cannot be stolen or forged. DBSC will run into all the same problems on platforms that don’t support TPMs. Not sure how this is changing the landscape. It’s just another implementation of the same thing.
DBSC is intended to be deployed opportunistically alongside regular cookies, so users on devices without TPMs just won't benefit from the additional protections that DBSC provides.
Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#43Earlier quoted context omitted.
[flagged]
> You all don't understand how any of this tech works but you think you do. We do; and it is specifically called out in the spec that the certificate chain is not submitted, due to the potential for overpowered fingerprinting. As such, this battle, should they make a move to change that, needs to be fought a different day. Fighting against hypotheticals is pointless. Edit: For the pedantic, fighting against hypotheti…
No, fighting against things that have already happened is pointless. We only ever fight against hypotheticals. We fight to avoid something happening that has not happened.
Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#44Unless you're paying me a lot of money (and even then) I WILL NOT MAINTAIN AN HSM FOR YOUR SERVICE. PLEASE FUCK OFF. If you cared about security you would let me authenticate with ssh key signatures. GitHub does this, if you can manage to talk to an HSM you can manage to talk to the openssh agent.
Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#45I think the DBSC is on the right direction but while it generates separate keys per session to prevent cross-session tracking (Google's ultimate ad dream), the spec acknowledges a critical vulnerability: malicious sites can collaborate by attempting to guess public keys until they find matches, creating persistent cross-site user identifiers, essentially weaponizing the security feature into the ultimate tracking sys…
Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#46Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#47Earlier quoted context omitted.
The very next step they will take is that they will only give devices session credentials that pass remote attestation, preferably to the browser level. Than you won't be able to use alternative clients or extension google doesn't deem acceptable.
(engaging in good faith...) What's preventing alternative clients from doing that?
Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#48Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#49Re: Google debuts device-bound session credentials against session hijacking
#50If they decide to make an example out of me, to teach the rest of you how to behave, I am screwed. I guess that's the "freedom" you US based folks are talking about. This has already been affecting the discourse on sites like HN for a while.