Earlier quoted context omitted.
A third problem that senior engineers might recognize: using numeric IDs on an outward facing object. UUIDs would have made this impossible as well
Using numeric IDs on an outward facing object is, for the most part, totally fine. It's a serious tradeoff to ditch the nice properties of numerical IDs and the legibility they provide in order to cargo-cult a "we must reveal nothing" approach, as you would here via UUID. It also misses the point of the actual security lesson: no matter the identifier, you need to be applying access controls to your data. Even if you…
The point is not that UUIDs are magically secure, it's that they mean nothing to whoever gains access except a single job app. The assumption is that they will get out (they're in a public URL), and that they will have no meaning when they do.
It's a defense-in-depth thing IMO -- cargo-culting this approach defends you even when you don't do the other things right. It's simple -- with a non-zero probability that the actual access control is faulty, do you want a default that protects you or doesn't. What's the intentional trade we're going for? More DB perf? Easier to type URLs? There are other ways to deal with those
> Can you tell I've been scarred by discussing designs with folks who focus on the "visible" problems without thinking about the fundamental question of "is this secure"?
Yes :(