Earlier quoted context omitted.
How about detailed fully functional blueprints for biological weapons, ready to send off to a protein synthesis service? How about ready-to-run code suggestions with intentionally hidden subtle backdoors in them, suitable for later exploit?
That information is already available to anyone who cares to look. Blocking it from LLMs creates an illusion of "safety", nothing more. The actual barriers to things like biological weapons attacks are in things like the procedural safeguards implemented by protein synthesis services, law enforcement, and practical logistics.
The intersection between "experienced biological engineers" and "people inclined to commit large-scale attacks" is, generally speaking, the empty set, and isn't in much danger of becoming non-empty for a variety of reasons.
The intersection between "people with access to a local LLM without safeguards" and "people inclined to commit large-scale attacks" is much more likely to be non-empty.
Safeguards are not, in fact, just an illusion of safety. Probabilistically, they do in fact likely increase safety.