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Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

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Re: Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

#41
post #2

Impressive. Would Apple be able to simply block non-Apple usage of Find My network usage simply by refusing to relay non-Apple BLE ID?

If I remember correctly, Apple was supposed to openly accept and encourage others to leverage their network and make more “AirTag” capable devices.

Yes, because they get a commission for every device registered on the network.

In the join process, there is a key that is shared only for developers who paid the fee - which is why it's not really trivial to create an AirTag clone without dumping the Apple AirTag flash

Re: Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

#42

https://robu.in/product/nrf51822-cfac-r-bluetooth-3-1edr-ble... Will this chip work ?

Yes. I did it with that too. Basically all nrf51 / nrf52 are compatible with the protocol. In my case I've written the code in Rust - but it's pretty much the same thing as the example

Re: Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

#43

Would there be a way for the bluetooth device to rotate its broadcast keys in a predictable way to avoid the iphone notification of "unknown airtag close by" messages? Seems like this could be exploited for surveillance.

Technically it would need to rotate every 15 minutes or so - the notification you're talking about happens when the device is in "lost mode" (away from its owner): in that case the key is rotate every 24 hours

Re: Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

#44

Would there be a way for the bluetooth device to rotate its broadcast keys in a predictable way to avoid the iphone notification of "unknown airtag close by" messages? Seems like this could be exploited for surveillance.

Sure, that works. One can also just cycle through a sufficiently large bank of pre-allocated keys, such that a findmy receiver doesn't see the same key too frequently.

You just need to derive a new key, this process is already part of the protocol to avoid being tracked while you wear your airtag

Re: Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

#45
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Are the clones any good though? Where do you even get them?

They've been perfect for me. I buy them on Temu for around $2.50 each and they work exactly like normal AirTags minus the ultra wideband precision finding. I pair and track them in the normal iOS FindMy app. Haven't been using them long enough to know how long the batteries last, but they advertise >1 year and they still all report pretty full batteries after a few months of usage, so I'm hopeful. The credit card for…

Any recommendation for brand etc for credit card sized ones? I’ve an old Tile that needs replacing.

Re: Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

#46
post #45
post #34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They've been perfect for me. I buy them on Temu for around $2.50 each and they work exactly like normal AirTags minus the ultra wideband precision finding. I pair and track them in the normal iOS FindMy app. Haven't been using them long enough to know how long the batteries last, but they advertise >1 year and they still all report pretty full batteries after a few months of usage, so I'm hopeful. The credit card for…

Any recommendation for brand etc for credit card sized ones? I’ve an old Tile that needs replacing.

"Brand" is a somewhat nebulous concept for chinese knockoffs, but the particular ones I got are each branded as "RSH Smart Tag." Though I'm pretty sure all the different listings are the same device coming out of the same factory with different random brand names printed on them. I'd just compare all the ones that say they work with iOS Find My and have wireless recharging, then get the cheapest one, specific branding be damned.

Edit: I just checked, and actually only two of my cards (which came in a two-pack) are branded with RSH, and the other one has no branding on it at all. It's definitely an identical device though - the only difference is the lack of branding.

Re: Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

#48

I wish it had a way to integrate with the Find My app instead of having to go through their own (wonky) process to retrieve locations. The chinese clones can do it (even with their own branding), so it must be possible somehow.

I think that's the wall in Apple's walled garden here. From reading the official Apple spec. for partners a while back, as part of the pairing process, something is signed by the device with a cert/key that apple issued to that developer (after coming to an agreement i.e - $$) - and, crucially, is different from the keypair that the device will use to actually broadcast. This is then validated by apple and thus allowed to be added to that apple-id's account and hence on to the app.

The keys broadcasted by the devices themselves in 'lost' mode (i.e. not in 2 way contact with the owner's device) are arbitrary and completely opaque, Apple doesn't have any way of tying them to an ID or device or developer. This is how the proposed project here works - these keys will always find their way to the apple server.

It seems like the knockoff ones have just hijacked a legit key for the pairing process. This means if Apple desires and finds out the key, it can probably remove all devices from all accounts - although the devices themselves will keep on broadcasting and their locations could be accessed in the above janky way. I wonder too if the original key owner might get a large bill for per-device royalties if/when Apple searches it's DB for a count of 'devices-added-to-an-apple-id-signed-by-this-key'...

Re: Openhaystack: Build 'AirTags' – track Bluetooth devices via Apple's network

#50
I wonder what’s the upper limit of transmissions a single device can upload to Apple servers? If the Apple device has no cell service or WiFi, how long will the history of that location ping reside on device?

Also, is there a DoS vector here?

- attacker manages to simulate 1M+ Bluetooth devices

- victim randomly passes by and it crashes their phone due to a massive number of devices in single location and constantly uploading to Apple servers

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