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The protester's guide to smartphone security

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Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#41

Earlier quoted context omitted.

How safe is Bluetooth really? Cities has scanners used to track devices for monitoring road congestion, malls have scanners to measure foot traffic. I have to believe that anyone with access to stingray type of device can track Bluetooth as well.

Don’t both Apple and Android implement random BT MAC addresses specifically to prevent this kind of tracking?

There could be other fingerprints besides MAC addresses.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#42

Earlier quoted context omitted.

While this is good info, it should also be known that in the USA, a judge (maybe and police officer?) can legally command you to unlock your phone via biometrics, but they cannot legally command you to unlock via password or passphrase. “Legally command” = command you to do something with the force of law, and legally punish you if you resist

The reasoning behind this is that your fingerprints and face etc. are public knowledge. Whereas you can retain your right to remain silent (about your password/PIN), failing to provide these aspects of your person can be viewed as not cooperating.

How does that mix with making direct eye contact

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#43

Briar messenger is specifically designed for things like protests. I think I would prefer it over Signal. The article says: >Signal has responded to 6 government requests since 2016, and in each case the only information they were able to provide was at most: ... That is the all the information they claimed they had. We have no way to know what they actually collect. Briar runs P2P over Tor so they can't collect data…

> Briar runs P2P over Tor so they can't collect data, even if they should want to.

That makes the common, dangerous, naive assumption that the implementation is secure. Correct, complete, secure implementations are very hard.

(It also assumes the design is secure, which is impossible to tell based on that limited information. P2P is not any more secure than over the Internet: In fact, it's easier to identify (there are only a few Briar P2P signals and near-infinite Internet signals - you've outed yourself), and if you mean local mesh P2P networking, that doesn't help at a protest, where the authorities also are present.)

In the more public app world, only Signal has done it well enough that experts trust it, and they have lots of free help from the expert security community.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#44
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal is open source and ships with verified builds, so yes, we have a way to know what they actually collect.

I meant at the server. We have no way to know that is running there.

The server is open source too. You could download it and run your own server, afaik.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#45

Th smartphone is the greatest mass surveillance device ever conceived, although AI monitored camera networks will probably exceed it very soon. There are basically no countermeasures. Which means freedom is truly at the discretion of the powerful, because once the government goes North Korea there is no going back. I actually think the biggest threat to humanity in the Great Filter sense is authoritarianism, more tha…

> Nothing can stop by he centralization of power that AI provides to the powerful

The social acceptance of defeatism and quitting is incredible - they couldn't have a more ideal opposition. You'll never win if you quit before you start. It's mass cowardice in the face of danger, with an excuse of course.

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#46
post #30

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal is open source and ships with verified builds, so yes, we have a way to know what they actually collect.

I meant at the server. We have no way to know that is running there.

isn't that what the e2e encryption is for?

I guess they could collect metadata of course

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#49
Old phones are an underappreciated resource, imo.

I keep a few handsets around for apps I don't want on my daily driver (ex:food ordering, 2FA).

More in line with the article: For alternate cell/SMS service I have a RedPocket SIM. (note: I see now it's $45/yr on ebay. I'm paying less, prob grandfathered).

Re: The protester's guide to smartphone security

#50
post #48

404 Media just released a great related article "The Powerful AI Tool That Cops (or Stalkers) Can Use to Geolocate Photos in Seconds" https://www.404media.co/the-powerful-ai-tool-that-cops-or-st...

What does this have to do with protests? Aren't protests by definition events where the organizers want people to be aware of?
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